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Abstrakt
In DS-CDMA Verfahren werden Nutzern eindeutige Spreizcodes zugeordnet, um
ihre Signale unterscheiden zu ko¨nnen. Dieses Verfahren wird sowohl in der Down-
link Richtung von der Basisstation zumNutzer und als auch in der Uplink-Richtung
vom Nutzer zur Basisstation eingesetzt. Spreizcodes werden in der Regel unter
Beru¨cksichtigung ihrer periodischen Korrelationseigenschaften entworfen. Spreiz-
codes mit guten Autokorrelationseigenschaften helfen dem Empfa¨nger Datenrah-
men zu synchronisieren, wa¨hrend periodische Spreizcodes mit gutem Kreuzkor-
relationseigenschaften das U¨bersprechen zwischen Nutzern und dadurch gegen-
seitige Sto¨rungen reduzieren. Weiterhin sind fu¨r viele dieser Spreizcodes ef-
fiziente Implementierungskonzepte bekannt. In heutigen Systemen erfolgt die
Zuordnung der Spreizcodes zu den Nutzern unabha¨ngig vom jeweiligen Kanalzu-
stand. In dieser Arbeit wird die Methode der kanalzustandsabha¨ngigen Zuord-
nung von Spreizcodes untersucht, um das Leistungsvermo¨gen des Downlinks zu
verbessern. Verschiedene Methoden der dynamischen Zuordnung der Codes wer-
den evaluiert, unter anderem die optimale Allokation, eine schnelle suboptimale
Allokation durch ein mathematisches Modell und ein Proof-of-Concept-Modell
mit Echtzeitkanalmessungen.
In der Kryptographie werden geheime Schlu¨ssel verwendet, um die Vertraulichkeit
der Kommunikation zwischen Netzwerknoten zu gewa¨hrleisten. Die U¨bertragungsart
in einem drahtlosen Ad-hoc- Netzwerk verlangt ein robustes Schlu¨ssel verwal-
tungssystem. Sicherheit in der physikalischen Schicht ist ein neuer Ansatz, der
die zufa¨llig wirkenden Schwankungen des Kanals und die Kanalreziprozita¨t zur
Schlu¨sselerzeugung verwendet. Durch den reziproken Charakter des drahtlosen
Kanals kann ein gemeinsamer Schlu¨ssel zwischen einem Knotenpaar erzeugt wer-
den. Der Prozess der Schlu¨sselextraktion besteht aus den folgenden vier Schritten:
Kanalmessung, Quantisierung, ”Information Reconciliation”, und ”Privacy Am-
plification”. Die reziproken Kanalschwankungen werden gemessen und quan-
xiii
tisiert, um einen vorla¨ufigen Schlu¨ssel aus Bit-Vektoren zu erhalten. Aufgrund
vonMess-und Quantisierungsfehlern, sowie GaußschemRauschen bestehen zuna¨chst
Unstimmigkeiten zwischen den vorla¨ufigen Schlu¨sseln. Mit Hilfe von Fehlererken-
nungs und Fehlerkorrekturmaßnahmen werden diese korrigiert und das Knoten-
paar erha¨lt einen synchronisierten Schlu¨ssel. Des Weiteren wird durch die Meth-
ode des sicheren Hashings die Entropie des Schlu¨ssels in der ”Privacy Ampli-
fication” Phase erho¨ht. Die Effizienz des Schlu¨sselgenerierungsprozesses ha¨ngt
von der Kanalmessmethode und dem Quantisierungsverfahren ab. Anstatt die
Kanalmessung direkt zu quantisieren, wird der reziproke Wert versta¨rkt und ent-
sprechend quantisiert, um die Schlu¨sselgenerierung effizienter und schneller zu
machen. In dieser Arbeit werden vier Methoden zur Versta¨rkung der Reziprozita¨t
vorgestellt: l1-Norm Minimierung, Gruppierung durch hierarchisches Clustern,
Kalman Filterung, und polynomiale Regression. Diese werden entsprechend bina¨r
und adaptiv quantisiert. Danach wird der gesamte Schlu¨sselerzeugungsprozess,
von der Kanalprofilmessung bis zum Erhalten des Schlu¨ssels, durch Echtzeit kanal-
messungen validiert. Die Performanzevaluierung erfolgt durch den Vergleich von
Bitfehlerrate und Schlu¨sselgenerierungsraten, Zufa¨lligkeitstests, Robustheitstests
und Abho¨rtests. Eine Architektur, KeyBunch, wird vorgeschlagen, um die Sicher-
heit der physikalischen Schicht effizient in mobilen ad-hoc Netzwerken und Ad-
hoc-Netzwerken in Fahrzeugen einzubinden. Schließlich wird KeyBunch als An-
wendungsfall in einer sicheren Fahrzeug Kommunikationsarchitektur eingebun-
den, um die Vorteile der Sicherheit in der physikalischen Sicht hervorzuheben.
xiv
Abstract
In DS-CDMA, spreading sequences are allocated to users to separate different
links namely, the base-station to user in the downlink or the user to base sta-
tion in the uplink. These sequences are designed for optimum periodic correla-
tion properties. Sequences with good periodic auto-correlation properties help in
frame synchronisation at the receiver while sequences with good periodic cross-
correlation property reduce cross-talk among users and hence reduce the interfer-
ence among them. In addition, they are designed to have reduced implementation
complexity so that they are easy to generate. In current systems, spreading se-
quences are allocated to users irrespective of their channel condition. In this thesis,
the method of allocating spreading sequences based on users’ channel condition
is investigated in order to improve the performance of the downlink. Different
methods of dynamically allocating the sequences are investigated including; opti-
mum allocation through a simulation model, fast sub-optimum allocation through
a mathematical model, and a proof-of-concept model using real-world channel
measurements. Each model is evaluated to validate, improvements in the gain
achieved per link, computational complexity of the allocation scheme, and its im-
pact on the capacity of the network.
In cryptography, secret keys are used to ensure confidentiality of communica-
tion between the legitimate nodes of a network. In a wireless ad-hoc network, the
broadcast nature of the channel necessitates robust key management systems for
secure functioning of the network. Physical layer security is a novel method of
profitably utilising the random and reciprocal variations of the wireless channel to
extract secret key. By measuring the characteristics of the wireless channel within
its coherence time, reciprocal variations of the channel can be observed between
a pair of nodes. Using these reciprocal characteristics of the wireless channel, a
common shared secret key is extracted between a pair of the nodes. The process
of key extraction consists of four steps namely; channel measurement, quantisa-
tion, information reconciliation, and privacy amplification. The reciprocal channel
variations are measured and quantised to obtain a preliminary key of vector bits
(0; 1). Due to errors in measurement, quantisation, and additive Gaussian noise,
disagreement in the bits of preliminary keys exists. These errors are corrected
by using, error detection and correction methods to obtain a synchronised key at
both the nodes. Further, by the method of secure hashing, the entropy of the key
is enhanced in the privacy amplification stage. The efficiency of the key gener-
ation process depends on the method of channel measurement and quantisation.
Instead of quantising the channel measurements directly, if their reciprocity is en-
hanced and then quantised appropriately, the key generation process can be made
efficient and fast. In this thesis, four methods of enhancing reciprocity are pre-
sented namely; l1-norm minimisation, Hierarchical clustering, Kalman filtering,
and Polynomial regression. They are appropriately quantised by binary and adap-
tive quantisation. Then, the entire process of key generation, from measuring the
channel profile to obtaining a secure key is validated by using real-world channel
measurements. The performance evaluation is done by comparing their perfor-
mance in terms of bit disagreement rate, key generation rate, test of randomness,
robustness test, and eavesdropper test. An architecture, KeyBunch, for effectively
deploying the physical layer security in mobile and vehicular ad-hoc networks is
also proposed. Finally, as an use-case, KeyBunch is deployed in a secure vehic-
ular communication architecture, to highlight the advantages offered by physical
layer security.
ii

Chapter 1
Introduction
In my thesis, I have focused on two topics namely; channel aware adaptation of
spreading sequences and physical layer security. In the first topic, I investigate
the method of allocating spreading sequences to users of direct sequence code
division multiple access (DS-CDMA) system, based on their channel condition.
While in the second topic, I investigate the method of extracting shared secret
keys using the reciprocal variations of the wireless channel.
DS-CDMA uses spreading sequences to separate different links, e.g., the base-
station to user links in the downlink or the user to base-station links in the up-
link. These sequences are usually allocated when the link is set up and kept fixed
for the duration of the transmission. They are mainly designed to have good
auto-correlation and cross-correlation properties. Good auto-correlation proper-
ties help in frame synchronisation at the receiver. While sequences with good
cross-correlation properties help in reduced cross-talk and interference between
different simultaneous DS-CDMA links. Generally sequences with good corre-
lation properties are allocated to users of DS-CDMA system irrespective of their
channel condition. In this thesis, the principle concept of allocating optimum se-
quences based on users’ channel condition is investigated.
In cryptography, the main attributes of a secure network are defined to in-
clude; availability, confidentiality, integrity, authentication, and non-repudiation
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of the nodes. Secret keys are necessary to maintain the confidentiality of commu-
nication between the legitimate nodes of a network. Traditionally secret keys are
established between the legitimate nodes using symmetric or asymmetric method
of cryptography. Hershey et.al. first introduced the concept of physical layer se-
curity in 1995 [44]. They showed that by exploiting the random and reciprocal
characteristics of the wireless channel, shared secret keys could be established
between a pair of nodes in the wireless network. With the advent of Internet-of-
things (IoTs), wherein energy constrained devices are all inter-connected to form
an ad-hoc network, security of IoT based devices has become very important. As
the IoT based devices are energy constrained and have limitations on their com-
putational resources, the traditional method of key management using asymmetric
or symmetric key cryptography is not very effective. In such cases, physical layer
security offers a new paradigm of profitably exploiting the wireless channel to
effectively establish shared secret keys. In this thesis, methods of effectively es-
tablishing physical layer security for devices in IoT are investigated.
1.1 Problem Statement
1. Channel aware adaptation of spreading sequences: To develop resource
allocation algorithms for allocating sequences to users based on their chan-
nel condition. The proposed algorithms must be evaluated for their per-
formance in terms of gain achieved per link, computational complexity of
allocation, and the effect on network capacity.
2. Physical layer security: To build effective secret key management systems
using the reciprocal variations of the wireless channel. It includes reci-
procity enhancement methods and appropriate quantisation methods. The
proposed key management methods are to be validated on testbeds that yield
real-world channel measurements. Further, architectures and frameworks
for deploying the key management systems in stationary, mobile, and ve-
hicular ad-hoc networks are investigated.
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1.2 Contributions of the Thesis
1.2.1 Channel aware adaptation of spreading sequences
Using different models such as; simulation model, analytical model, and hardware
model, the allocation of spreading sequences based on users’ channel condition is
investigated.
1. Simulation model: In the simulation model, I have proposed an optimum
method of allocation based on the Hungarian algorithm. This method al-
lows an optimum allocation of spreading sequences to users based on their
channel properties. Further, evaluation of its performance in terms of gain
achieved per link and the computational complexity of the allocation scheme
has also been done. The results of this model have been published in [8, 9].
2. Analytical model: In the analytical model, an expectation of the achievable
gain for optimum allocation is calculated. To compensate for the overhead
of computational complexity, a fast sub-optimal allocation method is pro-
posed. The results of this model have been published in [9, 21].
3. Hardware model: As a proof-of-concept, channel co-efficients from real
world are measured using a software defined radio platform. The measure-
ments are then used to validate the concept of adaptation of sequences based
on simulation and analytical model. The results of this model are under sub-
mission.
1.2.2 Physical layer security
The main contributions of my thesis in physical layer security are:
1. Enhancing channel reciprocity: To improve the efficiency of quantisation, I
have investigated different methods of enhancing channel reciprocity namely:
(a) l1-norm minimisation
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(b) Hierarchical clustering
(c) Kalman filtering
(d) Polynomial regression
These methods have been evaluated with real-world channel measurements
to validate improvement in the performance. The results have been pub-
lished in [5, 4, 10].
2. Quantisation: In order to generate preliminary keys from channel profiles,
two quantisation methods,median and adaptive quantisation have been pro-
posed. These methods were evaluated with real-world channel measure-
ments and have been published in [5, 4, 10].
3. PhySec framework: A complete framework for physical layer security start-
ing from initial channel measurement, enhancing channel reciprocity, quan-
tisation, information reconciliation, and privacy amplification has been pre-
sented in my thesis.
4. Cross-layered architecture: By combining the traditional method of asym-
metric cryptography and physical layer security, a cross-layered approach
of key management for resource constrained platforms has been presented
in [104]. This was a joint work with the security group EMSEC at the Ruhr
University Bochum.
5. KeyBunch: A key management architecture to effectively generate and dis-
tribute secret keys using various channel profiles and quantisation schemes
is presented.
6. Evaluation and validation: The proposed framework has been evaluated
using real world channel measurements. The measurements include three
types of wireless channel namely:
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(a) Indoor static channel: 2x3 MIMO measurements provided by Fraun-
hofer HHI Berlin have been used to validate the effect and impor-
tance of frequency selectivity in static environments. The results of
this work are currently under submission.
(b) Outdoor mobile channel: Measurements from mobile ad-hoc network
derived using wireless cards have been used to validate the physical
layer security framework. The results of this work have been published
in [5, 4, 10].
(c) Outdoor vehicular channel: As a test case for car-to-car communica-
tion, measurements from vehicular channel have been used and vali-
dated. The results of this work have been published in [5, 4, 10].
7. Finally a real-time USRP based demo, showing the extraction of secret keys
based on RSSI has been evaluated.
The contributions of the thesis have been published in various peer reviewed
conferences. The publication list for channel aware adaptation of spreading se-
quences are [8, 9, 21]. While the publication list for physical layer security are
[5, 4, 10, 104]. While publications [6, 7] are under submission.
1.3 Organisation of the Thesis
The organisation of the thesis is as follows:
1. An introduction to DS-CDMA, link adaptation, and design of spreading
sequences is presented in Chapter 2.
2. In Chapter 3, the principle concept of channel aware adaptation of spreading
sequences is discussed. With the help of a link model and system model,
the principle concept of dynamically allocating the spreading sequences is
presented. The different methods of modeling namely; simulation model,
analytical model, and hardware model are also investigated.
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3. The state of the art of physical layer security is presented in Chapter 4. It
includes a broad overview of the need for security in wireless ad-hoc net-
works and the principle of channel reciprocity. Then the standard method
of key generation in physical layer security is presented. Further, the evalu-
ation metrics used to validate the methods and the need for better methods
of key generation are discussed.
4. In Chapter 5, different methods of channel reciprocity enhancement, quan-
tisation, information reconciliation, and privacy amplification are investi-
gated. An architecture to employ physical layer security in wireless ad-hoc
networks is also proposed. Finally, an use-case for deploying physical layer
security based key management system in vehicular communication is pre-
sented.
5. Chapter 6 deals with the testbed used to obtain real-world channel measure-
ments and to validate the key generation algorithms. Further, the perfor-
mance of the key generation algorithms are evaluated and their results are
compared with those present in the state of art.
6. Finally, the main contributions of the thesis are concluded in Chapter 7.
Further directions for future work are also outlined.
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Chapter 2
Link Adaptation in DS-CDMA
The wireless channel is the medium of data transmission in wireless communi-
cation. Its main characteristic being variations of the channel strength over time
and frequency [90]. These variations lead to large-scale and small-scale fading of
the transmitted signal. Large-scale fading is frequency independent and results in
path loss and shadowing. While small-scale fading is frequency dependent and
leads to multi-path interference. Typically, transmitter-receiver systems are built
around the characteristics of the channel in order to maximize the system perfor-
mance and to deliver a required quality-of-service (QoS).
2.1 Direct Sequence Code Division Multiple Access
Direct sequence code division multiple access (DS-CDMA) is an access scheme
that allows users to access the channel at the same time and frequency. Unlike
time division duplex (TDD) and frequency division duplex (FDD) schemes, users
transmit asynchronously in DS-CDMA as there is no need for precise time or
frequency co-ordination. Wideband code division multiple access (WCDMA) is
an air interface standard that uses DS-CDMA channel access method in Third
generation mobile communication (3G). It is expected that by the end of 2018,
WCDMA will be supporting up to 4.4 Billion subscribers worldwide [1].
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In DS-CDMA, the information signal is spread to a higher bandwidth by mod-
ulating it with a spreading sequence. Spreading sequences are variations of pre-
defined set of alphabets. They are constructed for optimum correlation properties.
Sequences with good correlation properties either periodic or aperiodic, enhance
system performance. For instance, sequences that satisfy the orthogonal property
or theWelch bound on the total squared correlation with equality, maximise the in-
formation theoretic capacity for a single cell synchronous single path DS-CDMA.
DS-CDMA uses spreading sequences to separate different links, e.g., the base-
station to user links in the downlink or the user to base-station links in the uplink.
These sequences are usually allocated when the link is set up and kept fixed for
the duration of the transmission. They are mainly designed to have good cross-
correlation properties in order to avoid interference and to be easy to generate in
order to reduce the implementation complexity. In addition, they are designed
to have good auto-correlation properties or equivalently a flat spectrum since this
guarantees the anti-fading capability of DS-CDMA links.
2.1.1 Properties of Sequences
Spreading sequences are designed for various properties such as:
1. Period(N ): The number of elements present in a single set of a sequence
is known as period of a sequence. It basically determines the length of the
sequence.
2. Family size(M ): It is the number of sequence sets in a family of sequence.
3. Correlation(Ri;i(); Ri;j()): Correlation of a pair of sequence is, the mea-
sure of the degree of similarity between them. If the measure of similarity
is between a sequence a^n(i) and its time shifted version a^n(i+ ), then it is
known as auto-correlation (Ri;i()) where:
Ri;i() =
N 1X
n=0
an(i)(a^n(i+ ))
 (2.1)
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While if the measure of similarity is between two different sets of sequences
a^n(i) and b^n(i), then it is known as cross-correlation (Ri;j()) where:
Ri;j() =
N 1X
n=0
an(i)(b^n(j + ))
 (2.2)
4. Maximum Non-trivial Correlation(Rmax): The maximum non-trivial corre-
lation is defined as
Rmax = maxfRam; Rcmg (2.3)
where Ram is the maximum out-of-phase(side-lobes) auto-correlation value
and Rcm is the maximum out-of-phase cross-correlation value.
5. Based on the maximum non-trivial correlation values, different sets of bounds
have been proposed namely:
(a) Sarwate bound [83]
R2cm
N
+
N   1
N(M   1)
R2am
N
 1 (2.4)
(b) Welch bound [96]
Rmax  N
r
M   1
NM   1 (2.5)
(c) Sidelnikov bound [86]
R2max 
8<:
p
2N for binary sequences
p
N for non  binary sequences
(2.6)
6. Linear span(L): If a sequence has a linear span of L = p, then by using 2p
number of successive elements, the sequence can be predicted by using an
algorithm such as continued fraction algorithm. Thus, the predictability and
the cryptographic strength of a sequence is characterised by its linear span.
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7. Pseudo-randomness: Sequences that satisfy the pseudo-random properties
are known as pseudo-random sequences. The three properties of pseudo-
randomness are [35]:
(a) The out-of-phase periodic auto-correlation must be as small as possi-
ble. i.e.
Ri;i() =
8<:N;  = 0k; otherwise (2.7)
where k is a constant and its value must be as small as possible.
(b) For every period, the number of 1s must be equal to the number of 0s.
(c) For every period, half the period should be of single length, a quarter
must be of length two, a eight, three and so on. A run here denotes
consecutive string of identical alphabets.
2.1.2 Optimum Sequences
Selecting the family of optimum spreading sequences leads to maximising the net-
work and information theoretic capacity[26, 81, 92]. It also optimises the transmit
power and the receiver structure [26, 81, 92].
In [81] and [92] sequence sets that maximise the information theoretic capacity
for a single cell synchronous single path DS-CDMA systems are investigated.
Similarly [93] investigates sequence sets that maximises the network capacity.
In both the cases it is shown that the information theoretic capacity and network
capacity depends on the sequence sets used and by choosing optimal sequence sets
the capacities can be maximised. For a given DS-CDMA system, if the number
of users (K) is less than the processing gain (N ), then orthogonal sequences like
Walsh-Hadamard are optimal. While if the number of users is greater than the
processing gain (K > N ), then sequences satisfying the Welch bound on the total
squared correlation with equality are optimal. Examples of such sequences are
Gold sequences. They are also known as Welch bound equality (WBE) sequences
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[91]. Gold sequences also satisfy the Sidelnikov bound with equality [35]. The
orthogonal sequences namely Walsh-Hadamard sequences and WBE sequences
namely Gold sequences are commonly known as optimal sets of sequences. These
optimal sets of sequences are considered in this thesis.
2.2 Link Adaptation
Due to the broadcast nature, the wireless channel is shared by many users resulting
in multiple access interference (MAI). To combat MAI, different strategies are
adopted at both the transmitter and receiver. For example at the transmitter, power
control and spreading sequence selection are adopted, while at the receiver, multi-
user detection and receiver beam-forming strategies are adopted [26].
Optimal sequences do not have perfect zero cross-correlation property and
hence are not perfectly orthogonal. This can cause degradation in system perfor-
mance multiple access interference [91]. To counter this problem, power control
is done to equalise received power per bit of all users. WCDMA uses fast closed
loop power control by estimating the received signal-to-noise ratio (SIR) and com-
paring it with a target SIR [46].
Adaptive modulation and coding (AMC) is another method of link adaptation
used in WCDMA that allows the power of the transmitted signal to be held con-
stant over a frame interval. The modulation and coding format is adapted to match
the channel condition of the user. Users closer to the base station experience better
SIR and hence are allocated higher order resources of modulation and coding (64
QAM, 3/4 turbo codes) . While users away from the base station experience worse
channel conditions and hence are allocated lower order resources of modulation
and coding (QPSK, 1/3 turbo codes).
Optimum sequences are optimum with respect to their construction properties.
Their usage allows to maximise network capacity, by reducing the interference.
So the best one can do in terms of construction are optimum sequences. However,
these sequences are allocated to users in a DS-CDMA system irrespective of the
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users’ channel condition. By allocating sequences to users based on their channel
condition, the received power at the user can be maintained constant to main-
tain any give QoS. The method of choosing sequences based on users’ channel
condition is investigated in the thesis. In the next chapter, the principle concept
of allocating sequences to users is presented with the help of different modeling
methods namely simulation, analytical, and hardware model. Their performance
is evaluated by gain achieved per link, complexity of computation and its overall
effect on the system throughput.
2.3 Summary
Sequences denote variations of a pre-determined set of alphabets. Based on the
type of alphabets they are broadly classified as binary and non-binary sequences.
The characterisation of sequences involves properties such as; periodic and aperi-
odic correlation, linear span, and bounds namely; Welch bound, Sarawate bound,
and Sidelnikov bound.
In general sequences with a large family size and decreased Rmax are pre-
ferred. A sequence with large family size offers increased number of sequences
for deployment. While a decreased Rmax results in anti-fading characteristics of
the sequences and also reduces cross-talk and interference among the users. How-
ever as the family size increases the value of Rmax also increases. Due to the
Welch bound it is also not possible to have sequences with both good auto and
cross correlation properties. Thus a tradeoff is considered and sequences with
specific properties of correlation and linear span are used in different applications
like; direct sequence spread spectrum, RADAR, receiver synchronisation, GPS,
and cryptography.
In terms of sequence design, optimum sequences are preferred for deployment
in DS-CDMA systems as they maximise system performance. However increased
system performance can be obtained by allocating the optimum sequences to users
based on their channel condition. Similar to existing link adaptation techniques
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such as power control and AMC, by allocating sequences to users based on their
channel condition, the user can maintain a minimum received power to satisfy
any given QoS. This method of channel aware adaptation is presented in Chapter
3 including various methods of validation and performance evaluation.
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Chapter 3
Channel Aware Adaptation of
Spreading Sequences
Spreading sequences are assigned to users to separate different links; uplink or
downlink, in DS-CDMA. Generally sequences with good properties of periodic
correlation are used for assignment such as the optimum sequences. Optimum
sequences satisfy the orthogonal property or the Welch bound on total squared
correlation with equality to maximise the information theoretic capacity of a sin-
gle cell DS-CDMA system. Walsh-Hadamard sequences (when K  N , for K
number of users and N spreading factor) and Gold sequences (K > N ) are ex-
amples of optimum sequences. Generally, these sequences are assigned to users
irrespective of their channel condition. In Chapter 3, we consider allocation of
optimum sequences to users based on their channel condition in order to improve
the performance of a DS-CDMA system.
In Section 3.2 using the link and system model, the principle concept of dy-
namically allocating sequences is discussed based on [84]. In Section 3.3 an op-
timum allocation scheme based on the Hungarian algorithm is proposed. Simula-
tion results based on a downlink are derived. In Section 3.4 a fast but sub-optimum
solution is proposed based on an analytical model. In Section 3.5 using real world
channel measurements, the method is validated and its performance is also evalu-
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ated. Finally the chapter is summarised in Section 3.6.
3.1 Principle of Dynamic Allocation of Sequences
3.1.1 The Link Model
A typical link model used in DS-CDMA consists of a transmitter, a channel, and
a receiver as shown in Fig. 3.1. Without loss of generality and in order to keep
the terminology simple, the transmission of only one symbol d is considered. At
the transmitter, the digital information signal d of duration T is spread using a
binary spreading sequence s of length N where s = (s(0); s(1); : : : ; s(N   1))
and s(n) 2 1. Exactly one spreading sequence period of N chips per symbol
duration T is assumed. The spread signal d  s(t) is transmitted over the multipath
radio channel. The channel is described by its instantaneous channel impulse
response h = (h(0); h(1); : : : ; h(L  1)) of L taps. Due to multipath propagation
the transmitted signal undergoes multipath fading [90] and the received signal e(t)
is given by:
e(t) = d  s(t)  h(t)
where  denotes convolution.
At the receiver, a channel estimation unit is used to estimate h. The chan-
nel estimation information is now used by a sequence selection unit to select the
”optimum” spreading sequence and inform the transmitter and the receiver on the
selection. The sequence selection unit can either be implemented in the transmit-
ter or the receiver. When implemented in the transmitter either a blind detection
scheme for the used spreading sequence is required or the receiver needs to be in-
formed about the selected spreading sequence; when implemented in the receiver,
the transmitter needs to be informed about the chosen spreading sequence. In the
latter case, additional signaling is required since the channel estimation informa-
tion needs to be sent to the transmitter. Although the granularity of this signaling
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Figure 3.1: The Transmitter-Channel-Receiver Link Model
can be reduced, it will still require a higher bandwidth than just the information
about the selected spreading sequence.
At the receiver, the incoming signal e(t) will undergo a matched filtering for
the fading channel (receiver filter) and will then be correlated with the spread-
ing sequence, i.e., chip-wise multiplied by s and integrated (integrate and hold
circuit). The latter step is the associated despreading operation for the spreading
operation at the transmitter.
Assuming that only symbol d was sent, the signal at the output of the receiver
sampled at t = 0 can be expressed by
v(0) = d  s(t)  h(t)  h( t)  s( t)kt=0 (3.1)
3.1.2 The System Model
Spreading sequences are characterised by properties of correlation, periodicity,
family size, maximum-linear span, and maximum non-trivial correlation. Cor-
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relation is a measure of similarity between two sets of sequences and periodic
correlation is pre-dominantly used to assert the worthiness of a sequence [35].
The need to consider aperiodic correlation of spreading sequences was first
demonstrated by Anderson and Wintz [11]. In their paper Anderson and Wintz
derived a bound on the signal-to-noise ratio at the output of a correlation receiver
for a spread spectrum multiple access system with a hard limiter.
Considering equation (3.1) again:
v(0) = d  s(t)  h(t)  h( t)  s( t)kt=0
It can be re-written as:
v(0) = d  ~Css(t)  ~Chh(t)kt=0
where
~Css(t) is the continuous-time aperiodic auto-correlation of the spreading sequence
~Chh(t) is the continuous-time aperiodic auto-correlation of the impulse response
of the channel.
The performance of a transmission scheme for BPSK and QPSK detection de-
pends on the real part of the despread signal. Hence taking the real part of the
despread signal from [84] we get:
<(v(0))  v = d  <(
N 1X
m=0
Css(m)  Chh(m)) (3.2)
where
Css(m) is the discrete-time aperiodic autocorrelation of the spreading sequence,
Chh(m) is the discrete-time aperiodic autocorrelation of the impulse response of
the channel.
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The discrete-time aperiodic autocorrelation of a sequence with the period N is
given by [35]
Caa() =
N 1 X
n=0
a(n)a(n+ )
where 0 <  < N   1. Since Css(0) = N , it is independent of the used spreading
sequence, hence:
v = d NChh(0) + d  <(
N 1X
m=1
Css(m)  Chh(m)) (3.3)
The first term in the above equation consists of constantsN and d and hence is in-
variant. In the second term, Css(m) is determined by the spreading sequence s(t)
while Chh(m) is determined by the state of the channel h(t) at a time t. Chh(m)
cannot be varied since it depends on the channel condition h(t), but Css(m) can
be varied depending on the spreading sequence s(t).
N 1X
m=1
Css(m)  Chh(m) (3.4)
So, we can choose a spreading sequence s(t) with the discrete-time aperiodic au-
tocorrelationCss(m) such that (3.4) is maximised. Maximising (3.4) increases the
magnitude of the value of despread signal v, and the power of the received signal.
Thus the main principle of allocating spreading sequences based on channel con-
ditions is to chose a sequence s(t) such that for a given channel condition h(t),
the magnitude of (3.3) is maximised.
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3.2 Simulation Model
High-Speed Downlink Packet-Access(HSDPA) is the first evolution step towards
Third Generation (3G) mobile technology. The key idea behind HSDPA is to im-
prove the packet data throughput using existing GSM and EDGE standards [46].
A simplified down-link model of HSDPA is shown in Fig. 3.2. It consists of
a base station serving 15 users, here called User Equipments (UEs). The trans-
mission between the base station and a user is described by the above defined
down-link model. The 15 UEs are assumed to have mutually independent channel
impulse responses.
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Figure 3.2: Basic HSDPA Model
3.2.1 Optimum Allocation
In order to allocate the sequences Si based on the channel conditions hj , equation
(3.3) can be re-written as:
Vi;j = d NChh(0) + d  <(
N 1X
m=1
Cssi(m)C

hhj(m)) (3.5)
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where i = j = 1; 2; : : : ; 15:
Cssi(m) is the discrete time aperiodic autocorrelation of the spreading code Si
Chhj(m) is the discrete time aperiodic autocorrelation of the channel condition hj .
Thus,
Vi;j =
2666666666664
V1;1 V1;2 V1;3 : : : V1;14 V1;15
V2;1 V2;2 V2;3 : : : V2;14 V2;15
V3;1 V3;2 V3;3 : : : V3;14 V3;15
: : : : : : : :
: : : : : : : :
: : : : : : : :
V15;1 V15;2 V15;3 : : : V15;14 V15;15
3777777777775
Now the idea is to choose and allocate spreading sequences with the value of de-
spread signal Vi;j from the above matrix such that the overall system performance
is maximised [8, 9]. To chose sequence Si(t) for channel condition hj(t) such that
the assignment of codes to users is maximum over all the other assignment.
Maximize
X
i;j
Vi;jhi;j (3.6)
for a given cost
C = max Vi;j
Minimize
X
i;j
fC   Vi;jghi;j
Minimize
X
i;j
 Vi;jhi;j
subject to constraints X
j
hi;j = 1
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X
i
hi;j = 1
This allocation problem is known as an assignment problem in the operations
research literature [79]. The assignment problem deals with the allocation of an
exclusive resource, from the source node to the destination node such that the
overall cost is maximised (or minimised, depending on the cost parameter). The
Hungarian algorithm provides an optimum solution for the assignment problem
[79].
Hence by using the Hungarian algorithm, spreading sequences can be chosen
from the matrix Vi;j and allocated optimally to each UE. For the case K = 15
users Walsh-Hadamard sequences are allocated while, for the case K = 33 users
Gold sequences of period N = 31 are allocated.
3.2.2 Performance Evaluation of Simulation Model
Monte-Carlo Simulations
To evaluate the performance of the simulation model, the achievable gain and
the computational complexity of the Hungarian allocation scheme, is calculated
based on the down-link physical layer as shown in Fig. 3.3. The modules of the
transmitter-channel-receiver are built in IT++[89]. For each channel realisation,
50,000 Monte-Carlo simulations are performed. The channel realisations include;
Indoor channel (1-tap), ITU Pedestrian A(4-tap), ITU Vehicular A(6-tap) channel
models.
Achievable Gain
Let SNRdyn be the the signal-to-noise ratio(SNR) of the the downlink, that al-
locates sequences dynamically to users based on their channel condition, while
SNRstat be the SNR of the downlink that allocates sequences statically to users
irrespective of their channel condition. Then the gain achieved is:
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Figure 3.3: Functional Block Diagram of Downlink Physical Layer.
Gain =
SNRdyn
SNRstat
(3.7)
where
SNR =
v2
N0 + I
(3.8)
where v is the energy of the received signal and N0 + I is the multi-path interfer-
ence.
The gain achieved for each set of sequences namely; Walsh-Hadamard sequences
and Gold sequences is shown in Table 3.1
Table 3.1: Gain(dB) Achieved from Monte-Carlo Simulations .
Gain in dB Walsh-Hadamard sequences Gold sequences
(K=15) users (K = 33)users
ITU PA(4 tap) 2.89 dB 1.15 dB
ITU VA(6 tap) 1.17 dB 1.07 dB
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Downlink Load Factor
To calculate the theoretical spectral efficiency of a cell in HSPA using dynamic
allocation of sequences, the downlink load factor DL is calculated as illustrated
in [46] Eqn. 3.9.
DL =
NX
j=1
vj  (Eb=No)j
W=Rj
 [(1  j) + ij] (3.9)
where,
 N : number of users per cell,
 vj: activity factor of user j at physical layer, 0.58 for speech,
 Eb=No: Signal energy per bit to noise spectral density,
 W : WCDMA chip rate, 3.84 Mcps,
 Rj: Bit rate of user j, 16 kbps for adaptive multi-bit rate wideband codec,
 j: Orthogonality of channel user j, 1 for fully orthogonal channel,
 ij: Ratio of other cell to own cell base station power, Macro-cell with omni-
directional channel 55 %.
A comparison of the system throughput for Walsh-Hadamard sequences obtained
for different spreading factors namely; 16, 32, 64, and 128 are as shown in Fig.
3.4.
A comparison of the system throughput for Gold sequences obtained for dif-
ferent spreading factors namely; 31, 63, and 127 are as shown in Fig. 3.5.
Expected Value
The expected value of gain (in dB) is also calculated by using the following equa-
tion
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Figure 3.4: Throughput comparison for Walsh-Hadamard sequences.
Figure 3.5: Throughput comparison for Gold sequences.
E[gain] =
E[SNRdyn]
E[SNRstat]
(3.10)
where E[ ] is the value of expectation.
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E[gain] =
E[v2dyn]
E[v2stat]
E[gain] =
E[d NChh(0) + d  <(
X
m>0
Css(m)C

hh(m))]
2
E[d NChh(0) + d  <(
X
m>0
Crr(m)C

hh(m))]
2
(3.11)
whereCss(m) is the aperiodic autocorrelation of the dynamically allocated spread-
ing sequence s(t), Crr(m) is the aperiodic autocorrelation of the statically allo-
cated spreading sequence r(t), and Chh(m) is the aperiodic autocorrelation of the
channel condition h(t). Since s(t) is chosen based on the channel condition h(t)
equation (3.11) can be simplified as:
E[gain] =
[d NE[Chh(0)] + d  <(
X
m>0
E[Css(m)C

hh(m)])]
2
[d NE[Chh(0)] + d  <(
X
m>0
E[Crr(m)]E[C

hh(m)])]
2
(3.12)
The expected value of the gain for both Walsh-Hadamard sequences and Gold
sequences for different channel realisations is as shown Table 3.2.
Table 3.2: Expected Value of Gain.
Gain in dB Walsh-Hadamard sequences Gold sequences
(K=15) users (K = 33)users
ITU PA(4 tap) 4.57 dB 3.50 dB
ITU VA(6 tap) 3.19 dB 2.78 dB
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Effect of Inter-symbol-interference
As seen in Tables 3.1 and 3.2, the expected value of the gain is higher than the
gain obtained from the simulation model. In the IT++ based simulations, due to
smearing of the symbols, a reduction in the SNR of the received signal is observed.
As the effect of ISI is not seen during the expected value calculations hence the
gain obtained using expected value is greater than gain obtained during the IT++
simulation model.
Computational Complexity
To compute the computational complexity of the Hungarian allocation scheme,
the Big O notation is considered. Equation (3.3) consists of N additions and N
multiplications. Hence the complexity of (3.3) is O(N). Using (3.5) the matrix
Vi;j is calculated that consists of K2 elements, where K is the number of users
in the down-link. Hence the complexity to construct the matrix is O(K2). The
computational complexity of choosingK optimum elements fromK2 elements is
O(K3) [79]. Thus the overall computational complexity of the Hungarian alloca-
tion scheme is O(K3 +K2 +N) = O(K3).
3.3 Fast, Sub-optimum Allocation
The Hungarian based dynamic allocation scheme is an optimal solution for al-
locating sequences. However the tradeoff in obtaining the gain is a high degree
of computational complexity i.e. O(K3). Hence the motivation for an analytical
model is, to devise a scheme that can allocate sequences with reduced computa-
tional complexity, and yet can achieve similar performance as compared to the
Hungarian scheme. The results of Monte-Carlo simulations obtained in the simu-
lation model is visualised to obtain clusters of sequences and channel conditions
as shown in Fig. 3.6.
The visualisation indicates a mapping of the channel conditions and its cor-
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Figure 3.6: Cluster Visualisation of Monte-Carlo Simulations.
responding allocated sequence. Based on this visualisation, the 15 concentric
regions are identified that correspond to the 15 allocated Walsh-Hadamard se-
quences. By applying a convex hull on to the 15 concentric regions, 15 concentric
circles of radii ri are obtained as shown in Fig. 3.7. Each circle represents a region
within which if a channel condition is mapped, then that sequence (circle) can be
allocated to it. Now to allocate sequences to users, the radii ri of concentric circles
is calculated. Each radius represents a sequence. Hence the order of the sequence
from the inner most to the outer most circle is calculated.
To allocate sequences toK users, the users’ channel conditions are mapped on
to the concentric circles. For each user, the distance w.r.t. the origin is calculated
and arranged in the ascending order. Let S^ be the order of the sequence obtained
from the concentric circles. Then the inner most circle would be S^1 and outer
most circle be S^15. The user nearest to the inner circle is allocated the code S^1
while the user nearest to the outermost code is allocated the code S^15. Thus a
pseudo-dynamic allocation of sequences to users based on their channel condition
is achieved [21]. This procedure is also repeated for Gold sequences to obtain
similar concentric regions and circles. In this case since 33 users are considered,
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Figure 3.7: Mapping clusters into concentric circles through convex hull.
33 concentric circles are obtained. The users are similarly mapped onto the circles
and accordingly allocated.
TheMonte-Carlo visualisation yields the pattern of channel condition-to-sequence
allocated cluster. By using this pattern the pseudo-dynamic allocation of se-
quences is achieved. The calculation of the distances of the users w.r.t. the origin
of concentric circles is the only computation that needs to be done thereby reduc-
ing the cost of allocation.
3.3.1 Performance Evaluation
The gain achieved by pseudo-dynamically allocating sequences to users forWalsh-
Hadamard sequences of SF=16 is upto 1.80 dB per link for ITU pedestrian A
channel(4tap). While for Gold sequences with SF=31 the gain obtained is upto
0.94 dB per link.
The order of the sequences obtained from the concentric circles is derived
through the Monte-Carlo simulations. Once the order is established by computing
the shortest distance, a pseudo-dynamic allocation of sequences can be achieved.
Hence the complexity is based on complexity of calculating the distance of the
channel condition w.r.t. the origin. Hence the complexity of calculating the dis-
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tance is O(1).
3.4 Hardware Model
Introduction to Software Defined Radio(SDR)
Traditionally hardware validation of transceiver modules has been through either
custom built RF circuits or through Application Specific Integrated Circuits(ASICs).
The process usually consists of building functional block-sets of the transceiver
modules in Hardware Description Language(HDL) like VHDL or Verilog. Then
a net-list is derived from the HDL modules that can be mapped on to Field Pro-
grammable Gate Arrays(FPGA). The mapped net-list is validated by using custom
built FPGA kits with suitable RF front-ends.
However this approach needs expertise in modeling HDL modules, mapping
and validating it on, FPGA kits. A recent trend has been to validate transceiver
modules on Software Defined Radio(SDR). Software defined radio is an evolu-
tion of custom defined radio frequency(RF) circuits. The term software defined
radio means that the radio functionalities are defined in a software like MATLAB,
SIMULINK, GNURADIO, GNU Radio, Companion(GRC) and they can be im-
plemented on a general purpose hardware with RF-frontends, instead of custom
designed RF circuits [69, 3, 18]. The hardware platform is capable of receiving
data from any frequency band (or at least some of the frequency bands) and can
demodulate the received signal in a software defined baseband.
The advantage of SDR is that the transceiver modules are defined in software
and then validated through the RF interface using real world channel measure-
ments. Any change or improvement to the transceiver modules can be easily done
through the software while they can still be validated using real world channel
measurements. And since one of the main objectives of the thesis is to validate
the key generation algorithms using real world channel measurements, the SDR
is a preferable testbed platform.
Currently many commercial SDR hardware platforms are available such as;
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Figure 3.8: Functional Block Diagram of USRP.
the Universal Software Radio Peripheral(USRP), SOftware developed RAdio(SORA),
and Lyrtech. There are also many software platforms available for building the
functionalities of the transceiver modules such as; MATLAB, SIMULINK, GNU
Radio[80], and GNU Radio Companion(GRC)[25]. The GNU Radio environment
provides an open source platform to develop transceiver modules in C++. The
control and data flow between the modules are defined in Python scripts. GRC is
a GNU Radio based graphical user interface(GUI) programming tool that consists
of pre-defined transceiver modules.
The SDR platform considered for this thesis is the USRP and the open-source
GRC tool is used to define the software defined baseband transceiver modules.
The functional block diagram of USRP and GRC is as shown in Fig. 3.8.
Working Model of USRP
The USRP has three important building blocks namely; the software defined
blocks sets, the motherboard, and the daughter board. The software defined base-
band processing block-sets are defined in GRC. Through a UHD driver, the base-
band modules are then mapped onto the FPGA while transmitting or receiving the
data in real-time. On the motherboard, the baseband digital signal is converted
to a baseband analog signal through the Digital-to-Analog converter (DAC). The
analog signal is then up-converted to a specified radio-frequency(RF) for transmis-
sion through the daughter boards. The associated steps from the software defined
block sets to the RF transmission, involves transmitting the data. The reception of
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data consists of receiving the data from the RF front-end, down-converting it to
an intermediate frequency, analog to digital conversion and to subsequently pro-
cessing it on the software defined modules. The specifications of the USRP used
are indicated in Table 3.3.
Table 3.3: Specifications of the Software Defined Radio.
Software GNU Radio Companion
Motherboard USRP N210
FPGA Xilinx Spartan 3A-DSP 3400 FPGA
ADC 100 MS/s dual ADC
DAC 400 MS/s dual DAC
Connectivity Gigabit Ethernet
Daughter board WBX (50-2200 MHz)
Antenna 3dBi gain Vert900
USRP-GRC Setup
The functional block diagram of the transmitter and receiver is as shown in Fig.
3.9. The transmitter module consists of a linear feedback shift register(LFSR)
as the source. It produces a maximal-length pilot sequence(m-sequence) [35] in
bipolar alphabets f1, -1g. The bits are then amplified and transmitted through the
USRP. Each packet transmitted is of 63 bits length. The data transmission happens
in the ISM band (ZigBee network [15]) at a frequency of 864 MHz.
As already discussed in Chapter 2, m-sequences have good periodic auto-
correlation property, i.e. they have a peak at the zero-delay and a very small value
at the out-of-phase correlation values. As a result of this property synchronisation
of each block of received data is relatively easier. By correlating the received sig-
nal to a corresponding m-sequence of the same length and order, as shown in Fig.
3.9, the peaks at the beginning of every data block is calculated. This information
33
	




 


	

   

Figure 3.9: Functional Block Diagram of Transmitter and Receiver.
is utilised to synchronise the received data. Once the blocks of data and their tim-
ing information are recovered, the impulse response of the channel is estimated
by; a) calculating the number of taps b) co-efficient of the impulse response of the
channel.
Least Square Channel Estimation
The received signal is autocorrelated with itself to identify multiple peaks in the
autocorrelated signal. The multiple peaks signify the number of times the same
data block has been received due to the multi-path transmission through the wire-
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Figure 3.10: Least Square Channel Estimation.
less channel. Thus by thresholding the peaks, the number of taps of the impulse
response of the channel is calculated. Once the number of taps are calculated,
the value of co-efficient i.e. the amplitude and phase of the impulse response is
calculated using the Least Square Estimation method [77, 54].
To estimate the impulse response of the channel, let us assume a signal source
that transmits a training sequence x(t) at the transmitter as shown in Fig. 3.10.
The received signal y(t) can be expressed as:
y(t) = x(t)  h(t) + n(t) (3.13)
where,  is the convolution operator, h(t) is the impulse response of the channel
and n(t) is the Additive White Gaussian noise(AWGN).
Re-writing it in the matrix form:
y = Xh+ n (3.14)
where h = [h0; h1; : : : hL]T is the L tap impulse response of the channel.
x = [x0; x1; : : : ; xP+L 1]T is the training sequence with the reference length P .
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The circulant training sequence matrix X is then given by
X =
26666666664
xL : : : x1 x0
xL+1 : : : x2 x1
: : : : : :
: : : : : :
: : : : : :
xL+P 1 : : : xP xP 1
37777777775
Assuming AWGN noise, the best linear unbiased least square estimate of the im-
pulse response of the channel is given by [77, 54]:
hest = (X
HX) 1XHy (3.15)
where XH is the Hermitian and X 1 is the inverse of the matrix X .
For a training sequence with an ideal periodic autocorrelation, (3.15) can be sim-
plified as [77, 54]:
hest =
1
P
XHy (3.16)
3.4.1 Proof-of-Concept
Experiment Methodology
The experimental setup used to obtain real world channel estimates is as shown
in Fig. 3.11. It consists of two USRPs, one as the transmitter and the other as
the receiver configured in a simplex mode. The experiment is conducted in indoor
lab and outdoor university campus. The indoor measurements yield single-tap
channel measurements. While the outdoor channel measurements yield channel
estimates from one-tap to four-taps. Based on these channel estimates, spreading
sequences are allocated to users of a down-link model as shown in Fig. 3.3.
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Figure 3.11: Outdoor USRP Setup.
3.4.2 Performance Evaluation of Hardware Model
Based on equation 3.7, the gain is calculated for each realisation. The gain achieved
for each set of sequences namely; Walsh-Hadamard sequences and Gold sequences
is shown in Table 3.4.
Table 3.4: Gain Achieved from Hardware Model.
Gain in dB Walsh-Hadamard Gold
Outdoor (2 tap) 0.21 dB 0.34 dB
Outdoor (3 tap) 0.84 dB 0.68 dB
Outdoor (4 tap) 0.92 dB 0.85 dB
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3.5 Summary
Spreading sequences are usually characterised by the properties of periodic and
aperiodic correlation. They are usually allocated to users irrespective of their
channel conditions. In this chapter the principle concept for allocating sequences
to users based on their channel condition was discussed.
For a given channel condition h(t), a sequence s(t) is chosen such that the
product of their aperiodic autocorrelation is maximised. By maximising their
product, the magnitude of the energy of the received signal is maximised. Thus
spreading sequences can be allocated to users based on their channel condition.
By considering a simplified downlink model, the sequences are allocated to
users dynamically based on their channel condition. The dynamic allocation is
based on an optimal allocation scheme known as the Hungarian algorithm. A
performance gain of up to 2 dB per user is achieved in the downlink, consisting
of K = 15 users for Walsh-Hadamard sequences. Whereas in case og Gold se-
quences, a gain of up to 1 dB per user is achieved. The computational complexity
of allocation scheme is O(K3).
The optimal Hungarian algorithm is computationally intensive. To combat
this problem a sub-optimal but fast allocation scheme is proposed through an an-
alytical model. The analytical model consists of a step function that allocates
pseudo-dynamically instead of dynamically. A similar performance is obtained
with a gain of up to 2 dB for Walsh-Hadamard sequences and a gain of up to 1 dB
for gold sequences at a reduced computational complexity of O(1).
As a proof-of-concept, real world channel estimates are obtained by using a
software defined radio platform USRP.
Thus, by evaluating different methodologies namely simulation model, ana-
lytical model, and a proof-of-concept based on a hardware model, spreading se-
quences are allocated to users based on their channel condition.
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Chapter 4
Physical Layer Security: State of the
Art
4.1 Introduction
In tune with Moore’s law[70], a rapid increase in computing and communication
power, and a significant decrease in the size and cost of hardware, has lead to
a increased deployment of mobile and vehicular ad-hoc networks. Such deploy-
ments can be broadly classified under the umbrella of Cyber Physical Systems
[34]. Examples of such deployments include;
1. Ambient assisted living [87, 101] that provide on-time assistance to elder
people and thereby aide them in living a better life.
2. Car to Car communication[27, 39, 60] that enhances the convenience of
drivers by giving them real-time information about, traffic conditions, weather,
accident spots, and entertainment services. This could greatly improve the
safety and reliability of road transport.
3. Deployment of cyber physical systems in the industry to help improve pro-
duction efficiency, communication between devices, and configurability of
devices.
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Hence machine to machine (M2M) communication will grow rapidly, improv-
ing communication and enhancing system capabilities. However this will also
increase the heterogeneity of the systems and their ability to access information
from various points of source. Given the mobility and broadcast nature of the
channel, security will be an important and necessary condition for wireless ad-
hoc networks. Since it is only security that will entitle the ad-hoc networks to
function, seamlessly and effectively. It is these aspects of security that are intro-
duced in this chapter.
The organisation of this chapter is as follows; in Section 4.2 a broad overview
of security in wireless ad-hoc networks is presented. In Section 4.3 the main
principle of channel reciprocity is discussed. The state of the art of physical layer
security is presented in Section 4.4. Section 4.5 deals with the evaluation metrics
used to validate the key generation algorithms of physical layer security. The need
for better methods is reasoned in Section 4.6 and lastly the chapter is summarised
in Section 4.7.
4.2 Security in Wireless Ad-hoc Networks
The attributes of security in an ad-hoc network are [105]; availability, confiden-
tiality, integrity, authentication, and non-repudiation of the nodes.
1. Availability: Availability indicates that the network can survive any form of
an attack by an adversary and yet be able to function normally. For instance
an active adversary can launch denial of services attack on any layer of
the network and effectively jam all services. Inspite of such an attack, the
network must be able to function properly.
2. Confidentiality: All communication happening between the authorised nodes
must not be accessible to the unauthorised nodes. Especially when ad-hoc
networks are entrusted with sensitive information, confidentiality of the data
must be maintained at all times.
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3. Integrity: The integrity of the data transferred between nodes must remain
incorrupt. All destined nodes must receive the data in an original and un-
corrupted form.
4. Authentication: The authenticity of the network is determined by an unique
identity of each node. By uniquely identifying each node, duplication and
forgery can be avoided.
5. Non-repudiation: All communicating nodes must be held responsible for
the data transmitted by them. This is to ensure the validity of the data from
its originating node.
An ad-hoc network satisfying all of the above mentioned attributes is secure. If
these attributes are not satisfied then, the network could be exposed to threats like
forgery, data deletion, modification, sniffing, denial-of-service attacks, and man-
in-the-middle attacks.
The confidentiality of the communication between nodes is ensured by encryp-
tion and decryption of messages. Encryption involves converting the original data
into unreadable data using a cipher paired with, a secret key. While decryption is
the reverse process of encryption. By using the same secret key and a decipher
algorithm, the original data is recovered.
For effective encryption-decryption of information, it is necessary to have se-
cret key management systems. The mobility and broadcast nature of wireless
channel makes it important to have effective key management systems. Key man-
agement systems are usually centralised. A central Certifying Authority is respon-
sible for managing keys among the nodes of the network. It makes sure that all
nodes have the necessary secret keys and from time to time they are refurbished
as necessary. Such a system is suitable for a fixed and non-scalable network. But
in case of mobile and vehicular ad-hoc networks, the topology of the network
keeps changing dynamically, hence it is not realistic to have a centralised author-
ity. Moreover a compromise of the certifying authority could compromise the
confidentiality of the whole network. Thus, it is desirable to have a distributed
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system wherein each node is responsible for their own key management system.
Conventional secret key management systems employ computational crypto-
graphic methods like, symmetric [13] and asymmetric key management systems.
Symmetric key management systems are computationally less intensive but de-
pend on a common shared channel. While asymmetric key generation methods
are secure but are computationally intensive. Employing conventional key man-
agement methods has certain limitations such as;
1. Constraints in terms of computational power and energy limitations of the
nodes limit the usage of asymmetric key generation schemes.
2. Due to bandwidth limitations, the exchange of high entropy keys is very
expensive.
3. Most of the ad-hoc networks lack online connections to servers that serve
Certificate Revocation Lists(CRL), thereby making it hard in implementing
a conventional certificate based key management system.
Hence alternate methods of key management are necessary. One such alternate
method that can adapt to the channel conditions and can be effectively deployed is
Physical Layer Security [40, 44]. By using the reciprocal and random variations
[50] of the wireless channel, a shared secret key can be established between a pair
of nodes of an ad-hoc network. Recently such methods have been proposed and
deployed in the state of the art such as in ;
1. Indoor wireless sensor networks(WSN)[98, 99, 100, 66, 67],
2. Ultra Wide Band(UWB) networks [64, 62],
3. Peer-Peer networks [88, 45, 78, 82, 47, 24]
4. Multiple Input Multiple Output(MIMO) systems [76, 94, 97, 103]
5. Orthogonal Frequency Division Multiplexing(OFDM) systems [55]
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Figure 4.1: Need for secrecy.
6. Mobile radio [41, 57, 65, 12, 51, 36]
Physical layer security offers an unique solution to the problem of key manage-
ment. By profitably exploiting the fading characteristics of the channel, key man-
agement systems can be deployed in a cost effective manner. Once such systems
are integrated, the application layer based encryption-decryption algorithms, can
extract the secret key from the physical layer. Without the need of any certifying
authority, key management can be done in a modular and scalable manner. A sur-
vey on such methods of key generation schemes currently proposed in the state of
the art is presented in the next section.
4.3 Principle of Channel Reciprocity
Fading is an inherent characteristic of the wireless channel due to which variations
in the amplitude and phase of the transmitted signal occur. Let us consider two
legitimate nodes of a wireless ad-hoc network named Alice and Bob as shown in
Figure 4.1. Let Eve be an adversary node that is passively eavesdropping on all
the communication between Alice and Bob. Let,
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 s(t) be a pilot sequence transmitted at time t
 ra(t) and rb(t) be the received signal at Alice and Bob respectively,
 ha(t) and hb(t) be the channel measurements of the multi-path channel mea-
sured by Alice, and Bob respectively,
 na(t) and nb(t) be the additive white Gaussian noise experienced at Alice
and Bob respectively.
Then the impulse responses, ha(t) and hb(t) can be expressed as shown in (4.1).
ra(t) = s(t)ha(t) + na(t) (4.1)
rb(t) = s(t)hb(t) + nb(t)
While let,
 rea(t) and reb(t) be the received signal at Eve due to Alice and Bob respec-
tively
 hea(t) and heb(t) be the channel measurement measured by Eve due to Al-
ice and Bob respectively ,
 ne(t) be the AWGN noise at Eve.
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Then the impulse response measured at Eve can be expressed as shown in (4.2).
rea(t) = s(t)hea(t) + ne(t) (4.2)
reb(t) = s(t)heb(t) + ne(t)
The principle of channel reciprocity [50] indicates that, the channel measure-
ments (ha(t)  hb(t)) when they are measured during the coherence time of
the channel. If  is the wavelength of the wave transmitted between Alice and
Bob, and if we assume that Eve is (=2) times away from both Alice and Bob
then, (hea(t) 6= ha(t)) and (heb(t) 6= hb(t)). Even though Eve has access to the
transmitted pilot sequence s(t), the channel measurement measured by Eve w.r.t
Alice and Bob will not be the same. For example if Alice and Bob communi-
cate at 2.4 GHz frequency, and if Eve is more than =2 = 6:25 centimetres away
from both Alice and Bob then equation (4.2) holds true. As seen in Figure 4.2,
the principle of channel reciprocity can be verified. Alice and Bob communicate
at 2.4 GHz frequency and conduct their channel measurements by measuring the
received signal strength indicator(RSSI). Eve is placed at a distance greater than
6.25 centimeters from both Alice and Bob and in turn measures it’s RSSI. As seen
from the figure, Alice and Bob measure similar variations of RSSI while Eve does
not measure similar RSSI variations. This is due to the principle of channel reci-
procity. Hence by using such similar, reciprocal, and random channel variations,
a shared secret key can be established between Alice and Bob. Thus an inherently
harmful characteristic of the wireless channel such as multi-path fading, can be
exploited profitably to build effective secret key management systems between a
pair of nodes in an ad-hoc wireless network.
4.4 Standard Method of Key Generation
The standard procedure of extracting secret keys consists of four important steps
as shown in Figure 4.3 namely:
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Figure 4.2: Principle of Channel Reciprocity.
1. Channel measurement
2. Quantisation
3. Information reconciliation
4. Privacy amplification
As a first step, the channel is probed at both the nodes to measure the varia-
tions of the channel within the coherence time, to obtain a channel profile. The
channel profile is then quantised to obtain a preliminary key. Due to variations in
the channel profile, the preliminary key constructed at both the ends do not match
for all the bits. Hence to synchronise the preliminary keys, error detection and
correction methods are used during the information reconciliation stage to obtain
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Figure 4.3: Standard Method of Key Generation.
a synchronised key. During the reconciliation process, the eavesdropper will also
have access to the error detection and correction bits. Thus to minimise the pos-
sibility of key prediction, the security of the synchronised keys is enhanced in the
privacy amplification stage to obtain a final secure key.
A detailed explanation of each step with appropriate references to the state of
the art is given in the following subsection.
4.4.1 Channel Measurement
To construct the channel profile, the variations of the channel are measured at
both the nodes within the coherence time of the channel. The various methods of
constructing channel profile include;
1. Received Signal Strength Indicator(RSSI): RSSI is an indicator of the re-
ceived signal strength at the receiver. It is usually used by wireless cards
in laptops and sensor nodes, to measure the strength of the received signal
w.r.t the base station or the transmitter. By measuring the variations of the
RSSI, channel profiles are constructed in [51, 103, 12, 74].
For wireless networks that experience a mobile channel, the variations in
RSSI are easy to obtain. For wireless networks that experience a static
channel, the variations can be obtained by using the frequency selectivity of
the channel as done in [98, 99, 100, 66, 67].
The primary advantage of RSSI measurements is that they can be easily
measured using off the shelf wireless cards. They are usually measured
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with the help of tools such as iw[48]. They don’t need either any kind of
special hardware or any modification to the wireless cards.
2. Impulse Response of Channel: Channel profile can also be constructed by
estimating the impulse response of the channel [90]. The estimate can in-
clude the number of multi-paths, the coefficients of amplitude, and the phase
of the channel. In [41, 57], phase estimates of the channel are used in build-
ing the channel profile.
The channel estimation methods can impact the effectiveness of channel
profile. Better channel estimation methods can yield better channel profiles.
3. Deep fades of received signal: Channel Profiles can also be constructed by
estimating the deep fades of the received signal [82]. However as mentioned
in [82], a special narrow band filter is necessary to measure the deep fades.
4.4.2 Quantisation
The channel profile is quantised into vector bits to obtain a preliminary key. Quan-
tisation can be done either on the whole block of the profile or on smaller blocks
of profile. They are broadly divided into lossy and lossless quantisation.
1. Lossless Quantisation: In lossless quantisation all measurements of the
channel profile are considered. This type of quantisation usually has a single
threshold. Values above the threshold are denoted as +1 and those below
are 1. The threshold is usually the mean or the median of the channel pro-
file. Examples of lossless quantisers are binary quantiser [12] and median
quantiser[85].
2. Lossy Quantisation: In this type, multiple thresholds are considered. Values
above and below the threshold, are usually assigned binary values according
to Gray coding. While values between the threshold are usually discarded.
The different methods of lossy quantisation include;
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(a) Radio-Telepathy [65]
(b) Adaptive Secret Bit Generation(ASBG)[51]
(c) Multi-bit Adaptive Quantisation(MAQ)[74]
(d) Channel Quantisation with Guard-band(CQG)[94]
(e) Multi-level quantisation[98, 100, 66, 67].
4.4.3 Information Reconciliation
The preliminary key obtained at both the nodes are usually not identical. Due
to noise, variations in channel measurement and variation in hardware, these er-
rors in preliminary key exist. However without a synchronised key, encryption-
decryption of the data is not possible. Hence to detect and correct the errors,
reconciliation is done.
During this process, one of the node (e.g. Alice) generates the parity bits (error
detection or/and error correction bits) of the preliminary key. Only the parity
bits are transmitted to the other node (e.g. Bob). Using the parity bits and its
(Bob’s) preliminary key, Bob computes the preliminary key of Alice and obtains
a synchronised key. The various methods of information reconciliation are:
1. Convolution codes [59]
2. Turbo codes [14]
3. Cyclic Redundancy Check(CRC) bits [75]
4. Low Density Parity Check(LDPC) codes [37, 76, 47, 64, 63, 62, 102]
5. Bose Chaudhuri Hocquenghem (BCH) codes [16, 55]
6. Key consistency algorithms [62, 103, 36]
7. Hash functions[56, 98, 100, 66, 67]
8. Fuzzy logic [29, 82]
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9. Cryptographic techniques like secure sketch [78], and Cascade protocol[51,
17]
This process can be computationally intensive while detecting and correcting the
erroneous bits. Hence by moving the computationally intensive process to nodes
with higher processing power, such as base stations, the complexity can be appro-
priately distributed.
4.4.4 Privacy Amplification
During the reconciliation phase, the eavesdropper also has access to parity bits.
To minimise the possibilities of key prediction, the security of the synchronised
key is enhanced by privacy amplification. It can be done by various methods such
as;
1. Secure hashes like SHA-1[72]
2. Fuzzy extractors[31, 78, 53, 30]
3. Pseudo-random generators from one-way function[38, 51]
4.5 Evaluation Metrics
In order to validate the effectiveness of the key generation methods, a set of met-
rics is necessary. Various metrics used in the state of art are;
1. Bit Disagreement Rate(BDR): BDR indicates the percentage of bits that
are in disagreement between the preliminary keywords of Alice and Bob. A
higher BDR, indicates higher number of bits in disagreement in a prelimi-
nary key, there by increasing the effort needed to synchronise them. A lower
BDR indicates, greater percentage of bits in agreement, thereby decreasing
the effort needed to synchronise.
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For example, with a lower BDR only error detection methods like CRC can
be employed. This would not only decrease the complexity of the system
but would also increase the system entropy.
2. KeyGeneration Rate(KGR): The key generation rate indicates the number
of secret key bits generated per second after quantisation. A higher bit rate
indicates a longer key can be generated in a shorter period of time. This
is essential since longer keys have higher entropy. A scheme with higher
KGR can generate higher entropy keys.
3. Randomness test: This indicates the randomness of the key. In order that
the keys generated be secure they must qualify the randomness test, since a
random key is harder to predict and hence break the encryption. The keys
can be tested for their randomness using various methods like the random-
ness test [35], the NIST test [72], and Muerer’s statistical test [68].
The NIST test can be conducted by using the NIST tool. It includes cal-
culating a p value for different parameters such as; Frequency, Runs, Se-
rial, Entropy, Cumulative sums, and Discrete Fourier Transform(DFT). If
(p  0:01) for every parameter, then the key passes the randomness test. In
this thesis the NIST tool has been used to test the randomness of the secret
key.
4. Testbed: As much as the performance of the key generation scheme de-
pends on the channel measurement and quantisation schemes, it’s perfor-
mance also depends on the kind of the testbed used to generate the secret
keys.
A testbed simulating the real-world parameters can yield metrics that will
not only be useful in developing better schemes of key generation, but also
will be very helpful in deployment. Since a testbed consisting of nodes in a
favourable environment(like line-of-sight conditions only) could yield bet-
ter metrics on the experimental testbed, but when deployed in the real world,
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their performance could be adversely effected. Hence it is very important
to test the key generation schemes on testbed that reflect real world chan-
nel conditions like non line-of-sight conditions, multi-path propagation, and
mobility, among the nodes of the network.
In this thesis, construction of such test-beds that reflect real world channel
conditions have been developed and will be discussed in detail in the next
chapter.
4.6 Need for Better Methods
Secret key management system exploiting the fading characteristics of the multi-
path channel is a novel idea. A very effective deployment of such key manage-
ment system can be achieved in mobile and vehicular ad-hoc networks. However
for such a deployment, proper design and implementation strategies is necessary.
The existing state of the art have thoroughly investigated all possible methods for
each block of the key generation scheme, as seen in the previous section. A lot of
possibilities exist, leading to a lot of variations. For effective deployment, it is es-
sential to outline proper design parameters and adopt suitable methods of; channel
measurement, quantisation, information reconciliation, and privacy amplification.
Then suitable metrics and appropriate testbeds need to be adopted for a proper
validation of the key generation scheme. However certain limitations do exist in
the current methods such as;
1. In most of the work a single point baseline architecture as shown in Fig-
ure 4.3 does not exist. Such a structure is an essential starting point for
developing better methods.
2. Most of the methods directly quantise the channel profile. Methods that
can enhance channel reciprocity is one area that needs a deeper enquiry,
since reciprocity enhancement methods can increase the performance of the
system.
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3. The channel measurements considered in most of the current methods are
either drawn from statistical simulation models [47, 94] or they use spe-
cialised hardware like ESPAR antenna [12], directional antennas [45], array
antennas[85], narrowband filters [82]. A testbed setup based on existing
hardware that can yield, real-world channel measurements can be highly
beneficial in validating the proof of concept.
4. Finally appropriate architecture for key management system and its corre-
sponding deployment scenarios need to be also explored.
Given the above limitations we can deduce that the methods proposed in the
state of the art are a good starting point in developing physical layer security.
However to improvise on the existing implementation the following objectives
can be proposed namely;
1. Introduce a common baseline model for key generation scheme.
2. Investigate various reciprocity enhancement methods in order to improve
the BDR and KGR rates.
3. Validate the proposed key generation schemes using testbeds that provide
real world channel measurements.
4. Finally propose suitable architecture and deployment use-cases for effective
implementation of key management system.
It is these objectives that are thoroughly investigated in the next chapter.
4.7 Summary
To summarise, systems like mobile and vehicular ad-hoc networks will be de-
ployed in large numbers in the future. Security of such networks is a necessary
condition to be met for a successful deployment. Secret key management systems
are an integral part of any security infrastructure.
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By using the inherent fading characteristic of the wireless channel, a shared
secret key between a pair of nodes can be established. The process consists of
measuring the channel profile, quantifying it to get preliminary keys, synchronis-
ing it, before finally obtaining a secure key. By covering different variety of key
generation methods, the various methods explored in the state of the art and their
performance have been extensively discussed in the chapter.
As seen in the previous section, existing methods give a good starting point
in building key management systems. However scope for improving the key gen-
eration process does exists. By systematically designing each block, an efficient
scheme of key generation can be developed.
Key objectives in building key management systems include; building effec-
tive channel profiles, enhancing the reciprocity of the channel profile, and adaptive
quantisation algorithms. To validate these schemes, it is equally important to test
them on testbeds that reflect the real world channel measurements. Once such
scheme is developed, an appropriate architecture and deployment strategies must
be also explored. It is these objectives that are discussed in the next chapter.
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Chapter 5
Improved Methods of Secret Key
Generation
5.1 Introduction
Establishing shared secret keys using reciprocal and random variations of wireless
channel, is a novel idea for deploying key management systems in wireless ad-
hoc networks. However several limitations as discussed in the previous chapter,
need improvements for effective deployments. Based on these limitations, the
following objectives are investigated in detail in this chapter. These objectives are
also the main contributions of the thesis, in the physical layer security section.
The main objectives are:
1. A baseline model clearly depicting every stage of the key generation scheme.
This includes from measuring the channel within the coherence time to,
generating synchronised and secure keys.
2. Investigate various reciprocity enhancement methods in order to improve
the performance of key generation. Most of the existing methods directly
quantise the raw channel profiles. By processing the channel profile, its
reciprocity can be improved.
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By enhancing the reciprocity, the BDR and KGR rates of the preliminary
key and hence the performance of key generation can be improved. Hence
methods that can enhance the reciprocity of channel profiles are investi-
gated.
3. The enhanced channel profiles must be quantised appropriately in order to
efficiently generate preliminary keys. Hence quantisation schemes for en-
hanced channel profiles are also investigated.
4. Suitable key management architectures and deployment use-cases are pro-
posed. This is necessary to give an initial idea of deployment of physical
layer security in wireless ad-hoc networks.
5. Finally a proof of concept for the proposed key generation schemes is built
by validating the schemes on testbeds that reflect real world channel mea-
surements.
The organisation of the chapter is as follows. In Section 5.2 the various methods
of reciprocity enhancement methods are discussed in detail. Then the methods of
information reconciliation and privacy amplification are also discussed. Section
5.3 deals with the architecture of deploying physical layer security in mobile and
vehicular ad-hoc networks. In Section 5.4 strategies for deploying physical layer
security are discussed. The emphasis is on deploying key management systems
for vehicular communication. Finally the main contributions of the chapter are
summarised in Section 5.5.
5.2 Enhancing Channel Reciprocity
By employing specialized hardware like ESPAR antenna [12], directional anten-
nas [45], array antennas[85], and narrowband filters [82], precise channel profiles
can be measured. However general purpose hardware like wireless cards, can-
not match the precision offered by the specialised hardware. Due to variations in
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Figure 5.1: Standard Method of Key Generation.
hardware, noise, and half-duplex nature of the transceivers, it is not possible to
construct channel profiles with exact reciprocities.
In the state of the art, most methods directly quantise the channel profiles as
seen from Fig. 5.1. However by processing the channel profiles as shown in Fig.
5.2 enhancement in the reciprocity of channel profiles could be achieved. This
enhancement in reciprocity can improve the performance of key generation. So in
this section, different methods that enhance the channel reciprocity are examined.
The different methods are:
1. l1-norm minimisation
2. Hierarchical Clustering
3. Kalman Filtering
4. Polynomial Regression
5.2.1 Notations
To begin with certain set of notations are introduced. These notations are used in
the forthcoming sections describing the methods of channel reciprocity enhance-
ment, quantisation, information reconciliation, and privacy amplification.
Let Y be the channel profile, x be the enhanced channel profile obtained after
enhancing the reciprocity. Let Keyprelim be the preliminary keys obtained after
quantisation, P be the parity bits used for reconciliation,Keysync be the synchro-
nised keys after information reconciliation, and Keysec be the secure keys ob-
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Figure 5.2: Enhanced Method of Key Generation.
tained after privacy amplification. The baseline model following these notations
is indicated in Fig. 5.2.
In the following sub-sections, 4 methods of key generation are introduced,
their abbreviations are as follows:
1. Key Generation by Enhanced Channel Reciprocity(KGECR)
2. Hierarchical Clustering based Key Generation(HCKG)
3. Kalman Filtering based Key Generation(KFKG)
4. Curve Fitting based Key Generation(CFKG)
5.2.2 l1-norm minimisation
The first method of enhancing reciprocity is the l1-norm minimisation [5, 58].
l1-norm minimisation is widely used in solving under-determined system of lin-
ear equations. An under-determined system of linear equations usually has more
unknowns than equations. Such a system can have infinite number of solutions.
However if a sparse solution exists then it can be determined by using techniques
such as the Greedy algorithm and linear programming [32].
Let the channel profile Y be obtained from the unknown vectors x such that:
Y = Ax (5.1)
60

	




 



	
 	
	
 	

 	
!
 " 



Figure 5.3: Enhancing Reciprocity through l1-norm minimisation(KGECR).
where, A is a K  N sensing matrix(K < N )[43]. To recover x, an initial
approximation vector x0 is obtained such that
x0 = A
0Y (5.2)
where A0 is the transpose of A. The vector x is recovered from x0 by applying a
l1-norm minimization[19, 20] on it such that:
minx2Rn jjxjj1 subject to Y = Ax (5.3)
The recovered vector x is the enhanced channel profile. The matrix A, used in
recovering the signal of interest is known as the sensing matrix.
Sensing Matrix: The matrix A is a sensing matrix if it satisfies the following
set of properties:
1. Restricted Isometry Property(RIP): The matrix A satisfies the RIP property
[43] if all of its sub-matrices As are subjected to the condition
(1  s)jjyjj2l2 jjAsyjj2l2 (1 + s)jjyjj2l2 (5.4)
where s 2 (0; 1) is the RIP constant and y 2 Rn.
2. Incoherence: The incoherence of the matrix A is defined as
 = maxj>k
j< Aj; Ak > j
jjAjjj2jjAkjj2 (5.5)
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The property of incoherence is to ensure that columns of matrix A are un-
correlated.
3. Orthogonality: The rows of the sensing matrix A must be orthogonal to
each other such that
< Aj; Ak > = 0 (5.6)
where Aj and Ak represent the jth and kth rows of matrix.
Toeplitz Random Sensing Matrix: An example of sensing matrix is the Toeplitz
random sensing matrix [43]. They satisfy all the above mentioned property and
are also easy for hardware implementation. They are constructed by using one of
the following distributions:
 ri  unif [ 
p
3=;
p
3=]
 ri 
8<: 1p ; with prob. 1=2 1=p; with prob. 1=2
 ri 
8>>><>>>:
1=
p
q; with prob. q=2
0; prob:(1  q); q 2 (0; 1)
 1=pq; with prob. 1=2
where,  = k for partial matrix,  = p for full matrix, and p = n+ k  1, (k  n).
Once the matrix is constructed the rows are orthogonalised to satisfy the orthogo-
nality property.
Binary Quantisation: The enhanced channel profile x is quantised using the
method of binary quantisation. The lossless binary quantizer consists of a sin-
gle threshold. Values above the threshold are allocated a 1 and those below it a 0
as shown in Fig. 5.4. The threshold is the mean of all the values of the enhanced
channel profile.
Thus in KGECR method the channel profile is enhanced by using l1-norm
minimisation and the preliminary keys are generated using the binary quantiser.
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Figure 5.4: Binary Quantisation.
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Figure 5.5: Enhancing Reciprocity through Hierarchical Clustering(HCKG).
5.2.3 Hierarchical Clustering
The second method of enhancing reciprocity is the hierarchical clustering. Hierar-
chical clustering is a method of clustering data points. By aggregating consecutive
pair of data points to form a new data point clustering can be achieved. The pur-
pose of clustering is to smoothen out irregular variations in the data. The aggre-
gation of the data is done by either taking the mean or median of the consecutive
points.
So in order to enhance the reciprocity, the consecutive data points of the chan-
nel profile are aggregated to obtain a smoothened channel profile. The enhanced
profile has better reciprocity compared to the original profile. However a disad-
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vantage is that the number of data points halve for every level of clustering thereby
decreasing the key generation rate by a factor of 2 for every hierarchy. Hence in
order to avoid a drastic reduction in key generation rate, hierarchical clustering
consisting of a single level is used. The enhanced channel profile is quantised
using an adaptive quantisation.
Adaptive Quantisation
The adaptive quantisation consists of the following steps:
1. The channel profile is divided into blocks of size Blocksize and then pro-
cessed according to different levels of quantisation. A blocksize of 10 al-
ways yields better performance.
2. Each level of quantization is based on the following relation:
(a) level 1 = [ 1; m^  
2
]
(b) level 2 = [m^  
2
; m^]
(c) level 3 = [ m^; m^+ 
2
]
(d) level 4 = [m^+ 
2
;1]
where, m^ is the mean and  is the variance of, the channel profile block.
Gray coding is used to assign a binary codeword to each quantization level
as shown in Fig. 5.6.
3. Alice transmits the positions that lie in quantization levels 1,3(00,11) and
2,4(01,10) respectively, to Bob. Bob sends an acknowledgement indicating
the commonly agreed levels of quantization.
Even though Alice and Bob exchange the levels of quantization, Eve will not
be able to compute the same values of level 1, 2, 3, and 4 since his mean and vari-
ance differ from that of Alice and Bob. Hence Eve cannot predict the preliminary
key by knowing only the levels 1 to 4.
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Figure 5.7: Enhancing Reciprocity through Kalman filtering(KFKG).
Thus in the HCKG method, the channel profile is enhanced by using the
method of hierarchical clustering and, preliminary keys are generated using the
method of adaptive quantisation.
5.2.4 Kalman Filtering
Kalman filter is the third method used for enhancing channel reciprocity [10].
Kalman filter also known as linear quadratic estimation, was first described in
technical papers by Swerling in 1958, Rudolf Kalman in 1960, and Kalman and
Bucy in 1961. It is a a set of mathematical equations that recursively estimates the
state of a process such that, the mean of the squared error is minimised [95]. It can
estimate past, present, and future estimates of a process even without an accurate
knowledge of the system being modeled. Thus it is used in various applications
like navigation, missile guidance and control, signal processing applications, and
even in stock market estimations.
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Figure 5.8: Recursive Iteration between Time and Measurement Update Equa-
tions.
The parameters of a system are recursively estimated by using apriori and
aposterio estimations. The initial prediction of channel profile is done in time up-
date equations. The predicted estimation is corrected in the measurement update
equations. As shown in Fig. 5.8 by recursively estimating between time and mea-
surement update equations, the channel profile values are estimated to obtain an
enhanced channel channel profile.
Let xk be the estimated channel profile and yk be the measured channel profile
such that [95],
xk = Axk 1 +Buk 1 + wk 1 (5.7)
where A is n n matrix representing the state at time k   1, B is a n l matrix
representing the optional control input u 2 Rl, and wk is the process noise.
yk = Hxk + vk (5.8)
whereH is themn matrix indicating the state of measurement at time k and vk
is the measurement noise.
The normal probability distribution of process and measurement noise is given by;
p(w)  N(0; Q) (5.9)
p(v)  N(0; R)
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where Q and R are the process and measurement noise co-variance respectively.
Let x^ k be the apriori estimation and x^k be the aposteriori estimation of the channel
profile then the errors during the estimation can be defined as;
e k = xk   x^ k (5.10)
ek = xk   x^k
where e k and ek are the apriori and aposteriori estimate errors respectively. Their
respective error co-variance being;
P k = E[e
 
k e
 T
k ] (5.11)
Pk = E[eke
T
k ]
The enhanced channel profile are estimated through a recursion between the
time update and measurement update equations.
The time update equations used to predict the channel profile are:
x^ k = Ax^k 1 +Buk 1 (5.12)
P k = APk 1A
T +Q
While the measurement update equations used to correct the apriori estimated
channel profile are:
Kk =
P k H
T
(HP k HT +R)
(5.13)
x^k = x^
 
k +K(yk  Hx^ k )
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Figure 5.9: Enhancing Reciprocity through Polynomial Regression(CFKG).
Pk = (I  KkH)P k
where, Kk is referred to as the Kalman gain.
Thus in the KFKG method, Kalman filter is used to estimate the enhanced
channel profile. The enhanced profile is further quantised using the method of
adaptive quantisation.
5.2.5 Polynomial Regression
The fourth method of enhancing channel reciprocity is polynomial regression.
Polynomial regression is a method of fitting a curve to a random set of data. It
belongs to the regression class of algorithms. The main objective is to describe a
polynomial function in time that best describes the rate of change of the random
samples.
Hence the method of enhancing reciprocity by polynomial regression is to
curve fit the random variations of the channel profile and obtain an appropriate
polynomial. The coefficients of the polynomial indicate the rate of change of the
channel profile variations. Hence it is the rate of change of channel profile that
describes the enhanced channel profile.
For a given channel profile, let the independent variable xi be time and the
dependent variable yi be the channel profile measurements. The polynomial ex-
pression representing the rate of change of random samples will be [4, 42]:
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yi = a0 + a1xi + a2x
2
i + : : :+ amx
m
i + i (5.14)
where i = (1; 2; : : : ; n), yi indicates the channel profile at time xi and i is the
difference in the measurements of channel profile. Hence the polynomial that
best fits the channel profile measurement is a0 + a1xi + a2x2i + : : : + amx
m
i
and a0; a1; : : : ; am are the coefficients of the polynomial that represent the rate
of change of the profile. The curve fit profile is the enhanced channel profile.
Thus the CFKG method enhances reciprocity by curve fitting the random vari-
ation of the channel profile and then quantises the enhanced profile by using the
method of adaptive quantisation.
5.2.6 Information Reconciliation and
Privacy Amplification
The disagreeing bits of the preliminary keys are detected and corrected in the in-
formation reconciliation stage as indicated in Fig. 5.2. Turbo Codes [14] are used
to detect and correct the disagreeing bits of the preliminary key. Bob calculates the
parity and tail bits for his preliminary key. Only the parity and tail bits are trans-
mitted to Alice. Alice receives the parity and tail bits, and detects and corrects the
disagreeing bits to obtain the preliminary key of Bob thereby synchronising it.
LetKA andKB be the preliminary keys of Alice and Bob respectively. Let PB
be the parity and tail bits calculated by Bob. Then Alice recovers the preliminary
key KB using the parity bits PB through a Turbo decoder. Thus both Alice and
Bob reconciliate for the same keyKB by using the Turbo decoder.
During information reconciliation, the parity bits transmitted through the wire-
less channel are also available to the eavesdropper. Hence to minimise the possi-
bilities of key prediction the bits of the synchronised key are de-correlated during
the privacy amplification stage. As described in the previous chapter, privacy am-
plification can be done using different methods such as; one-way functions, fuzzy
extractors, and secure hashes.
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In this thesis the SHA-1 [72] secure hashes are used for the privacy ampli-
fication stage. SHA-1 is a one-way cryptographic hash function that produces
a 160-bit secure hash. It was designed by the United States National Security
Agency as a Federal Information Processing Standard. One way functions are
functions wherein a corresponding output is generated from a given input. How-
ever the input cannot be predicted by using the output hence the name one-way
functions. It also has the avalanche property i.e. a slight change in the input pro-
duces a completely different result. This property greatly enhances the security of
the secure key since any change in single bit of the input key drastically changes
the final secure key.
The topic of information reconciliation and privacy amplification are not the
main objectives of the thesis. In order to build a complete system of key gen-
eration, information reconciliation and privacy amplification methods have been
implemented with the methods present in the state of the art. For reconciliation
the Turbo codes of the IT++ tool are used. While for SHA-1, the matlab code
available at NIST [72] is used to derive the SHA-1 secure hashes.
5.3 Architecture: KeyBunch
To effectively deploy key management system in wireless ad-hoc networks, it is
essential to have an architecture. Since an architecture can help in design, plan-
ning and a subsequent deployment of key management systems. To thoroughly
exploit the fading characteristics of the wireless channel an architecture KeyBunch
is proposed.
The objective of KeyBunch is to exploit all possible characteristic of the wire-
less channel and extract, synchronised and secure secret keys, to make it available
to the application layer (for encryption and decryption) in real time. The func-
tional block diagram of KeyBunch is as shown in Fig. 5.10.
The main functions of KeyBunch are:
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Figure 5.10: KeyBunch:Key Management in Ad-hoc Networks
1. A channel profile CN is built by measuring the channel inN different meth-
ods.
The different channel measurements can include: RSSI profiles, impulse
response of the channel, phase estimates, or deep fades of the received sig-
nal as discussed in the previous chapter. The purpose of including different
methods of channel measurements is to ensure a high degree of system en-
tropy. Moreover different methods of channel measurement can provide
different random sources for key generation.
2. The channel profiles CN are quantized to obtain the preliminary set of keys
Keyprelim(M), where M = N  P and P is the number of quantization
algorithms considered for quantising the profiles. The quantisation on the
set of channel profiles CN can be done in two ways.
In the first method, if only a single method of channel measurement (e.g.
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RSSI) is possible then, different quantisation schemes can be employed on
the same channel profile. Since several quantisation schemes use different
threshold parameters, mutually exclusive preliminary keys Keyprelim(M)
can be obtained on the same profile. For example, different quantization
algorithms based on RSSI have been proposed in [51, 74, 12, 5, 4]. These
algorithms can be used on the same RSSI profile to generate different sets
of preliminary keys.
For the secondmethod, a device that can record multiple methods of channel
measurement, different methods of quantization [94, 65, 51, 74, 98, 12, 5, 4]
can be employed. This will also certainly yield different preliminary keys.
3. The errors present in preliminary keys can be detected and corrected by
using the various methods of information reconciliation as discussed in the
previous chapter such as Turbo codes, Cascade protocol, LDPC codes etc.
Thus a synchronised bunch of keys Keysync(M) is obtained.
4. Finally the entropy of the synchronized keys is enhanced by various meth-
ods of privacy amplification to obtain a secure key-bunch Keysec(M).
Thus KeyBunch facilitates the extraction of synchronised and secure set of keys
Keysec(M) by utilising the random variations from N different channel profiles.
This method can be adopted in wireless ad-hoc network to satisfy the confidential-
ity attribute of security. Before the nodes generate KeyBunch it is essential that
they commonly agree upon the parameters of N and P , i.e. the number and type
of channel profiles and the number and type of quantisation algorithms. Hence
an initial configuration of commonly agreed parameters is necessary. But once
these parameters have been setup, secure key bunches can be established between
peer-peer nodes of an wireless ad-hoc network.
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5.4 Deployment Strategies
Recent methodologies such as the Internet-of-things (IOT), Machine to Machine
Communication (M2M), Cyber Physical Systems (CPS) have got more recogni-
tion from both industry and academia. Be it in terms of ideas, concepts, projects,
products, and a viable roadmap for the future, significant efforts have been made
in this direction. For instance a quick search on these topics in IEEE Xplore re-
sults in around 1800 results for IOT, 67000 for M2M, and nearly 1200 for CPS
indicating interests in; envisioning future systems, applications, deployments, and
business models.
Wireless communication technologies such as Personal Area Networking (PAN),
Vehicular Communication (VC) or Car to Car communication, Wireless Sensor
Networks (WSN), Mobile Communication Standards such as 2G, 3G, 4G, all
come under the gambit of the above proposed systems. Envisioning and deploying
such systems have been possible due to development in both sensor and commu-
nication technologies.
For a successful deployment of these systems it is necessary that the attributes
of security must be met. For it is security that will allow a seamless and non-
intrusive connectivity among the nodes of the network. As an use case scenario,
the security in Vehicular Communications (VC) is considered in this section. The
objective is to explore the possibility of key management in VC by applying the
concepts of physical layer security.
The rapid growth of vehicles over the past decade has presented an abundance
of problems related to road safety such as; an increase in accidents, traffic con-
gestion, and pollution. These problems are bound to grow over time with an ever
increasing growth of vehicles. Hence to deal with this situation and improve the
condition of road safety and travel, the idea of VC has been envisioned. With sig-
nificant advances in sensing and communication technologies, efforts are being
made to introduce communication capabilities between vehicles such that road
safety can be improved dramatically.
Vehicular communication aims at fostering road traffic management by pro-
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Figure 5.11: Securing Vehicular Communication.
viding real-time traffic management in terms of speed, congestion, weather pat-
terns, emergency services, and tourist information. Availability of such services in
real-time can thus significantly improve the safety and reliability of road transport.
The system model of VC can be as shown in Fig. 5.11. Vehicular communica-
tion consists mainly of vehicles on the road and road side infrastructure (RSI) off
the road. Equipped with onboard sensors and communication equipment, commu-
nication can happen between both vehicle to vehicle (V2V) and vehicle to road
side infrastructures (V2RSI).
In order to fulfill the objectives of security in VC, the Secure Vehicle Commu-
nication (Sevecom) consortium [28] was founded by an industry-academia col-
laboration. It mainly focusses on providing a baseline architecture for security as-
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Figure 5.12: Baseline architecture for Sevecom.
pects in VC such as; identity, cryptographic management, privacy protection, se-
cure communication, and in-car protection [73]. The baseline architecture aimed
at both the vehicles and road side infrastructure units (RSUs) is shown in Fig.
5.12.
5.4.1 Secure Vehicular Communication(Sevecom)
Since the main focus is on key management system the other attributes of Sevecom
are not discussed here. Only the aspects of key management in VC are of main
interest. The module that addresses the key management attribute of VC is the
Hardware Security Module (HSM) [73] as shown in Fig. 5.12.
The main objective of HSM is to store sensitive information and provide a
secure time base. It is responsible for the confidentiality of the communication
happening between V2V and V2RSI and is the, main basis of trust. It hosts a set of
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secret keys that are used for decryption of data. An initial set of keys are installed
during initial installation. Further long-term updates of the keys are issued by the
Certifying Authorities (CAs) for lifelong maintenance.
The HSM consists of a CPU, a non-volatile memory, an inbuilt clock and an
I/O interface. Thus its functionalities can be implemented as a SOC. It also has
a built-in battery, a tamper detection and reaction circuitry. Any tampering of the
HSM module leads to erasure of the private keys thereby preventing any form of
secret key extraction.
Porting KeyBunch to Sevecom
The HSM modules of Sevecom has the following limitations that can be over
come by implementing physical layer security. The limitations are:
1. Dependability for Keys: The HSM is always dependent on an external au-
thority for the supply of secret keys. This dependency is an overhead and
also a weak link for the system security. Instead an autonomous system of
key management where the nodes can independently manage keys is neces-
sary.
2. Points of Compromise: The keys installed on the HSM can be compro-
mised at various points such as during initial installation, long-term update
by CAs or during servicing of the vehicles at garages. Stolen secret keys
will eventually lead to a compromise in confidentiality of the vehicular net-
work eventually making them vulnerable to attacks.
3. Lifelong Maintenance: The HSM comes with a set of pre-installed keys.
These keys need to be updated periodically by the CAs in order to prevent
any brute force attack. Hence an overhead of lifelong maintenance of the
secret keys is always present.
4. HSM Tampering: The HSM is always at a risk of being tampered with. For
instance the HSM can be tampered with during the servicing of the vehicle.
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Therefore tamper detection and reaction circuitry are necessary.
The above listed limitations can be overcome by deploying KeyBunch based SOC
implementation into the HSM [6]. By doing so, the following advantages can be
realised:
1. Autonomous Key Generation: Both the Vehicles and RSI will be empow-
ered to independently generate their own keys. Dependency on an external
authority will not exist since all keys will be generated by using the random
and reciprocal variations of the wireless channel in real-time.
Hence a Plug & Secure approach for key management can be realised in the
HSM module of the Sevecom architecture.
2. Compromise Proof: Since all keys will be generated independently and in
real-time, the points of compromise and the need for lifelong maintenance
will not exist.
3. Tamper Proof: All keys will be generated in real time hence no keys need
be stored in the HSM. As a result, the risk of HSM tampering also does not
exist.
4. Enhanced Security: With the KeyBunch, multiple sets of keys(instead of
a single key) can be generated. This can eventually be used in various
configurations to enhance system security. For instance, either the entire
KeyBunch can be used or a different key from the KeyBunch can be used
per session, for establishing confidentiality between nodes. This will drasti-
cally increase the effort needed to break the key through a brute force attack
thereby enhancing the security.
Thus by exploiting the random and reciprocal variations of the wireless channel,
KeyBunches can be established between vehicles-to-vehicles(V2V) and vehicles
to road side infrastructure(V2RSI).
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5.5 Summary
Improved methods of key generation schemes utilising the random and reciprocal
variations of the wireless channel have been discussed in this chapter. The main
objectives that were covered are:
1. A baseline architecture model clearly depicting the four stages of key gen-
eration. The four stages discussed and implemented include; channel mea-
surement, quantisation, information reconciliation, and privacy amplifica-
tion.
2. A fifth stage namely ”enhance reciprocity” is proposed to improve the key
generation scheme. Various methods are used to process the channel profile
and to enhance its reciprocity. They include:
(a) l1-norm minimisation
(b) Hierarchical Clustering
(c) Kalman Filtering
(d) Polynomial Regression
3. The enhanced channel profiles are quantised appropriately. For the l1-nom
minimisation method a binary quantiser is used to generate the preliminary
keys.
While for the other three methods namely; Hierarchical Clustering, Kalman
filtering and Polynomial regression, an adaptive quantisation is used.
4. The disagreeing bits of the preliminary keys are detected and corrected us-
ing Turbo codes to obtain a synchronised key.
5. To prevent any possibilities of key prediction, SHA-1 secure hashes of the
synchronised key are generated to finally obtain, secure keys.
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6. Based on the above mentioned five stages, four different methods of key
generation have been proposed namely:
(a) Key Generation by Enhanced Channel Reciprocity(KGECR)
(b) Hierarchical Clustering based Key Generation(HCKG)
(c) Kalman Filtering based Key Generation(KFKG)
(d) Curve Fitting based Key Generation(CFKG)
7. An architectureKeyBunch that utilises all the characteristic of wireless chan-
nels and generates, synchronised and secure bunch of secret keys is pro-
posed. The main advantage of KeyBunch is that instead of generating a
single key, sets of secure keys can be generated by using either the same or
multiple sources of wireless channel. This drastically enhances the system
entropy.
8. As a usecase, the KeyBunch is deployed in Vehicular Communications to
securely generate keys between vehicle to vehicle and vehicle to roadside
infrastructure. By porting KeyBunch onto the HSM module it is shown that
the system entropy of the vehicular communication can be enhanced.
Thus all the four main objectives described at the beginning of the chapter have
been thoroughly discussed. In the next chapter, the fifth objective of validating
the proposed schemes on a testbed yielding real world channel measurements and
evaluating its performance is discussed in detail.
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Chapter 6
Testbed and Performance
Evaluation
The evaluation of improved methods of key generation proposed in the previous
chapter using real-world channel measurements is done in this chapter. This chap-
ter is organized as follows; in Section 6.1 the testbed comprising of MIMO setup
and wireless cards is presented. In Section 6.2 the performance of the key gen-
eration is evaluated with focus on static networks, mobile ad-hoc networks, and
vehicular ad-hoc networks. In Section 6.3, observations based on the results of
performance evaluation are discussed. Finally the chapter is summarized in Sec-
tion 6.4.
6.1 Testbed
Statistical channel models based on Rayleigh fading characteristics are usually
used to model the behavior of wireless channels during software simulations.
Such statistical models give a good approximation of the nature of fading and
the Doppler effects on the transmitted signal. They are a good starting point in
validating transmitter and receiver systems. However for effective deployment, a
working proof-of-concept based on channel measurements from real world would
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Figure 6.1: Framework for Key Generation.
be beneficial. Hence in order to develop proof-of-concepts, testbeds reflecting real
world channel measurements are constructed and used for validation.
The testbeds include; 2x3 MIMO setup, IEEE 802.11 based wireless cards,
and Universal Serial Radio Peripheral (USRP) based software defined radio. They
cover three channel conditions namely; static networks, mobile ad-hoc networks,
and vehicular ad-hoc networks.
In case of the setup consisting of MIMO link and wireless cards, the method-
ology is to build databases of channel profiles (RSSI) and process it offline, using
the framework shown in Fig. 6.1. While in case of the USRP based setup, a
real-time bi-directional key generation is demonstrated.
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6.1.1 Static Networks
Given the wide deployment of static networks (e.g. wireless sensor networks), the
problem of extracting secret keys in such networks is important. As the variations
in static channels are relatively flat, it is difficult to extract secret keys. Hence
methodologies for extracting keys in static networks need to be determined.
This work was a joint effort between Fraunhofer Heinrich Hertz Institute (HHI)
Berlin and University of Kaiserslautern as part of the BMBF project Prophylaxe.
HHI provided the 2x3 MIMO channel measurements through their MIMO testbed
and the measurements were validated using the framework developed in this the-
sis as shown in Fig. 6.1. The main result of this collaboration was that by using
frequency selectivity, extraction of keys in static networks can be done effectively.
System Setup
The measurement setup for the 2x3 MIMO network is shown in Fig. 6.2. It
includes:
 A host computer to adjust the MIMO-transceiver to a desired configuration
and to control the transmission process (with the Agilent software VEE).
 Five analog-to-digital and digital-to-analog boards within a common frame
allowing a simultaneous trigger for all boards and hence a simultaneous
transmission and reception. Two inputs and two outputs are used from each
board yielding a maximum transmission rate of 250 kbit/s per port.
 The Insertion (6 HU x 1/2 19”) contains five reciprocal transceiver with
adjustable baseband amplification which are fully controllable via the host
computer. Thereby, every transceiver can be switched in the transmit or
receive mode independent of the other transceivers. Reciprocal transceivers
are designed to allow an improved ad-hoc reciprocity [52].
 The LO for the MIMO-transceiver which consists of a commercial available
synthesizer delivers a power of about 10 dBm at a frequency of about 5.2
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Figure 6.2: MIMO-TRx configured as 2x3-MIMO-System.
GHz to each transmitter. To allow frequency dependent channel measure-
ments the LO frequency can be adjusted by the computer.
 Two cubic antennas, one at each side of the setup to avoid a LOS connection.
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The antennas and the corresponding polarisations used are shown in Fig.
6.3.
As modulation different 128-bit long orthogonal Gold-series are applied to the
transmitting antennas and transmitted simultaneously to the receive antennas. Then,
the received signals are correlated with the transmitted Gold-series yielding sepa-
rated channel characteristics.
Channel Measurements
The channel measurements estimated for the transceiver is as shown in Fig. 6.4.
The RSSI 1 is calculated from the h parameters namely h11; h12; h21, and h22 such
that:
RSSI = 10  log10(h211 + h212 + h221 + h222)
Four different channel conditions for the testbed are considered namely; Cha; Chb; Chc;
and Chd. The characteristics of each channel is described as:
1. Cha: Measurements are conducted in the frequency range of 5.15 to 5.25
GHz. All measurements are conducted in an empty room, with each channel
separated by 1/2 MHz to obtain 200 channels (sub-bands).
2. Chb: Measurements in the frequency range 5.15 to 5.25 GHz are conducted
in the same room with two people. Each channel is separated by 1/3 MHz
to obtain 300 channels.
3. Chc: Channel measurements in the frequency range of 5.19 to 5.21 GHz
are conducted for a static channel with varying power level as shown in Fig.
6.5. Each channel is separated by 1/3 MHz to obtain 60 channels.
1Hardware manufacturer specified RSSI to have a measure of the mean received RF-power (
dB) for using in the following baseband circuits [2]. Absolute accuracy of the RSSI reading is not
specified as well as a linear operation over the total range. Here, RSSI is approached by the power
of the channel measurements.
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4. Chd: Channel measurements in the frequency range of 5.19 to 5.21 GHz are
conducted for a static channel with varying positions. A total of 60 channels
is obtained by separating them at 1/3 MHz.
The size of the room where the channel Cha; Chb; Chc; and Chd is measured is
about 5 m x 8 m with a height of about 3 m.
6.1.2 Mobile Ad-hoc Networks
To simulate the conditions of moving networks, mobile ad-hoc networks are con-
structed using IEEE 802.11 based wireless cards. Wireless cards are transceiver
front-ends that are usually built-in with all laptops. They are mainly used in con-
necting the client (such as laptops) to an access points (AP), to enable the clients,
wireless fidelity and over the air access of Internet. These wireless cards can also
be obtained as off-the-shelf hardware. Manufacturers of such wireless cards in-
clude, Intel, Atheros, and D-Link. They transmit and receive using Time Division
Duplex (TDD) diversity in the ISM frequency band. RSSI is one of the parameters
considered to connect clients to the nearest base station.
System Setup
In this thesis four laptops are considered for the testbed based on wireless cards.
They are named as Alice, Bob, Eve, and Janet. Alice and Bob are the legitimate
nodes. While Eve and Janet are the adversary nodes that passively eavesdrop on
the communication happening between Alice and Bob. Alice is configured as the
base station. While Bob, Eve, and Janet are configured as client.
All the four laptops have Ubuntu operating system installed. An utility tool
known as ”iw”[48] is used to measure the RSSI on each laptop. Alice is equipped
with an Atheros wireless card while Bob, Eve, and Janet are all equipped with
Intel Pro wireless cards. Wireless cards from different manufacturers are used, to
ensure heterogeneity in RSSI measurements.
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Alice always initiates the communication by transmitting pilot sequences. Upon
initiation, Bob, Eve, and Janet acknowledge back by transmitting their pilot se-
quences. The communication happens in 2.4 GHz frequency in the ISM band.
Bob is placed at a distance of 50 meters from Alice, while Eve is 20 meters away
from both Alice and Bob, and Janet is 40 meters away from both Alice and Bob.
Channel Measurements
To simulate the channel conditions of a mobile ad-hoc network, Alice moves
around, while Bob, Eve, and Janet are all kept stationary. Alice moves upto 200
meters from its starting point in order to obtain channel measurements that reflect
non-line-of-sight conditions. The RSSI profiles are obtained by conducting the
experiment in various channel conditions such as; Indoor lab, University Campus,
Forest(near the University), and City Center.
The iw tool assists in measuring the RSSI values. A total of 75 RSSI measure-
ments are recorded per profile. The sampling rate is varied from 2, 1, 1.5, and 0.5
samples per second. For each channel condition 20 readings are taken, so a total
of 100 RSSI profiles from different channel conditions are used to build the RSSI
profile database.
6.1.3 Vehicular Ad-hoc Networks
The rapid growth of vehicles and road-side infrastructure has given rise to vehic-
ular networks that mainly consists of communication between vehicles and road
side infrastructure. To simulate the conditions of vehicular network, we consider
two cars, each equipped with laptops. The front car is equipped with the laptop
Alice while the following car is equipped with the laptop. Both cars are driven
simultaneously around the city, and RSSI variations are recorded. The RSSI vari-
ations are recorded for a speed of 30 km/hr.
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6.1.4 Framework
To process the channel profiles, an offline key generation framework is built as
shown in the Fig. 6.1. It includes:
1. MATLAB based reciprocity enhancement modules namely; l1-norm min-
imisation, Hierarchical clustering, Kalman filtering, and polynomial regres-
sion.
2. MATLAB based quantisation algorithms such as; ASBG, MAQ, Radio-
Telepathy, Median quantiser, ESPAR, binary quantiser, and Adaptive quan-
tiser.
3. The IT++[89] based Turbo encoder-decoder is used for information recon-
ciliation.
4. The secure hashes SHA-1 are derived using the open source MATLAB code
provided by NIST [71].
The purpose of creating a channel profile database and an offline based framework
is to allow rapid prototyping and development of key generation algorithms.
6.2 Performance Evaluation
The key generation schemes are evaluated for the set of metrics as discussed in
Chapter 4 namely:
1. Bit Disagreement Rate (BDR) to evaluate the efficiency of the key genera-
tion scheme.
2. Quantization Factor (QF): Quantization factor is the percentage of bits re-
tained after quantization. For lossless quantization, QF = 100 %, while for
a lossy quantization QF < 100 %.
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3. Randomness test to evaluate the randomness of the generated key. The ran-
domness test is done by using the NIST tool [71, 72].
4. Robustness test to evaluate the robustness of the method to heterogeneous
channel measurements.
5. Eavesdropper test to evaluate the predictability of keys by the eavesdropper.
6.2.1 MIMOMeasurements
The results of the BDR and QF are indicated in Table 6.1 and 6.2. The results
indicated are averaged in each case for the following number of measurements i.e.,
for channel typeCha = 2000(200 sub-bands x 10 iterations),Chb = 3000(300x10),
Chc = 2400(60x40), and Chd = 2400(60x40) measurements.
Table 6.1: Bit disagreement rate(%) of preliminary keys.
Channel type Kalman filter Polynomial regression
Cha 0.96 1.94
Chb 1.73 6.62
Chc 4.50 1.75
Chd 3.48 2.15
Table 6.2: Quantization factor(%) of preliminary keys.
Channel type Kalman filter Polynomial regression
Cha 78.60 88
Chb 65 73
Chc 78.33 87.43
Chd 72.64 82.67
The number of bits extracted is given by the quantization factor(QF). So con-
sidering a best case scenario, for an input of 100 bits to the quantization block, up
89
to 88 bits(best case for polynomial regression) and 78 bits(best case for Kalman
filtering) can be extracted.
The randomness test is done by using the NIST tool. As illustrated in Table
6.3, a p value is calculated for the parameters such as: Frequency, runs, longest
runs of ones, Serial, Entropy, Cumulative sums, and DFT. If (p  0:01) for every
parameter [72], then the key passes the randomness test.
Table 6.3: Evaluation of the randomness test by the NIST tool.
Criteria Cha Chb Chc Chd
Frequency 0.34 0.87 0.27 1.0
Frequency with block 0.22 0.14 0.63 0.96
Runs 0.23 0.52 0.68 0.21
Longest Runs of Ones 0.82 0.54 0.37 0.65
Serial 0.49 0.34 0.79 0.89
Entropy 0.96 0.06 0.37 0.49
Cumulative Sums 0.82 0.68 0.54 0.99
DFT 1.0 0.15 0.47 0.47
6.2.2 RSSI Profiles
Bit Disagreement and Key Generation Rates
The average BDR and KGR values for each algorithm is calculated and their per-
formance is indicated in Table 6.4 and 6.5.
Test of Randomness
The randomness test is done by using the NIST tool. Table 6.4 indicates that all
the key generation methods pass the randomness test for the RSSI profiles. The
process of randomness test is illustrated in Table 6.6. For each parameter a p
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Table 6.4: BDR and Randomness Test for RSSI Profiles.
Algorithm type BDR% Randomness Test
ASBG 24.7 Pass
Median 36.3 Pass
MAQ 32.36 Pass
ESPAR 20.6 Pass
Radio-Telepathy 37.6 Pass
Barasochhi 22 Pass
KGECR 4.5 Pass
HCKG 8.49 Pass
KFKG 6.21 Pass
CFKG 3.02 Pass
Table 6.5: KGR of RSSI profiles.
Algorithm type Q factor KGR (bps)
ASBG 0.45 0.9
Median 1 2
MAQ 1 2
ESPAR 0.4 0.8
Radio-Telepathy 0.175 0.35
Barasochhi 2 4
KGECR 1.705 3.41
HCKG 0.425 0.85
KFKG 1.6 3.2
CFKG 1.695 3.39
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value is calculated. If p  0:01 for every parameter [72], then the key passes the
randomness test.
Eavesdropper Test
The RSSI profiles of both Eve and Janet are used to derive preliminary keys. Their
BDR w.r.t Alice is calculated as indicated in Table 6.7.
Robustness test
Commercial wireless cards have a certain degree of offsets since no two wireless
cards can have identical measurements. With heterogeneous channel measure-
ments the BDR and KGR rates may get affected. To simulate the effect of hetero-
geneous channel measurements, artificial offsets in step of 5 dB is introduced
ranging from -20 to + 20dB. Table 6.9 and 6.8 indicates the effect of heterogeneity
on the average BDR and KGR.
6.3 Observations
The following observations are deduced from the validation and performance eval-
uation of key generation schemes:
1. Testbed: The testbed used to validate the methods of key generation con-
sists of two types namely; wireless cards from laptops and the software de-
fined radio USRP. The wireless cards yield real-world RSSI profiles, whereas
the USRP yields real-world channel impulse response profiles.
By using the channel impulse response profiles, magnitude and phase pro-
files are further derived. Hence the proposed key generation algorithms are
validated using the RSSI, magnitude, and phase profiles.
2. Frequency Selectivity: From Fig. 6.4 we observe that the channel fading is
dominant in the sub-bands from 5.15 to 5.25 GHz as compared to fading in
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each individual band. Hence we choose a single RSSI value from each sub-
band ranging from 5.15 to 5.25 GHz. Depending on the type of channel, the
number of RSSI measurement varies per profile.
For instance, for channel Cha, 200 sub-bands(channels) are present, sepa-
rated by 1/2 MHz and hence the RSSI profile consists of 200 values. While
for the other channel conditions namely Chb, Chc, and Chd 300, 60, and
60 channels respectively are considered.
3. Evaluation of RSSI Profiles
(a) From Table 6.4 it can be observed that the proposed algorithms namely
KGECR[5], HCKG, KFKG, and CFKG[4] have decreased bit dis-
agreement rates compared to the other methods in the state of the art.
The proposed algorithms undergo enhancement in reciprocity through
l1-norm minimisation, hierarchical clustering, Kalman filtering, and
curve fitting(polynomial regression).
As a result of the enhanced reciprocity and appropriate quantisation,
the bit disagreement rate is considerably reduced as compared to the
other methods in the state of the art.
(b) The KGR figures for RSSI profiles are indicated in Table 6.5.
An increased key generation rate for KGECR, HCKG, KFKG, and
CFKG methods can be observed as compared to the other methods in
the state of the art. This is also due to the enhancement in reciprocity
of the RSSI profile and an appropriate quantisation method thereafter.
(c) The results of the randomness test is indicated in Table 6.4 and 6.6.
Since p  0:01 for all the parameters as shown in the table, the pro-
posed methods pass the randomness test.
(d) The proposed methods also pass the eavesdropper test as indicated
in Table 6.7. The BDR for Eve and Janet is greater than 25% for
HCKG, KFKG, and CFKG methods of key generation. Hence even
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with the help of the parity bits, Eve or Janet will not be able to deduce
the synchronised key. As a result the three methods are secure w.r.t
passive eavesdropping.
In case of KGECR method, if Eve and Janet posses the same sensing
matrix then their BDR is significantly less w.r.t to Alice. But in case
Eve and Janet do not posses the same sensing matrix used by Alice
and Bob, then BDR is significantly higher and hence they will not be
able to predict the synchronised key.
(e) Finally the methods of HCKG, KFKG, and CFKG also pass the ro-
bustness test. In spite of a changes in the RSSI profiles due to intro-
duction of artificial offsets, the BDR and KGR do not vary. While for
the KGECR method the BDR varies and KGR does not vary.
6.4 USRP based Real-time Demonstrator
As discussed in Chapter 3, the universal serial radio peripheral(USRP) is used
as a platform to validate signal processing block sets. A real-time demonstrator
showing the capability of key generation in real-time is undertaken. Based on the
specifications indicated in Table 6.10, signal processing blocks of the transmitter
and receiver are defined in Simulink. The specification of USRP are shown in
Table 6.11.
The signal processing blocks for transmitter and receiver are as shown in Fig.
6.6 and 6.8. At the transmitter, the generated binary bits are modulated by quad-
riphase shift keying. The modulated bits are pulse shaped using a raised cosine
transmit filter with  = 0:5 and transmitted through the USRP. The frame format
consists of 26 bits of preamble (2x13 bits of Barker codes). The message bits
consist of data ”Hello World” numbered from (0-99). In total, the frame format
consists of 200 bits including both the preamble and message bits.
At the receiver, the bits are received and corrected w.r.t their gain. After doing
frequency compensation and timing recovery, the transmitted data is recovered
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to display ”Hello World(0-99)”. The Simulink signal processing blocks of the
transmitter and receiver are standard examples of the Simulink library. These
cited standard blocks have been reused in this thesis.
Further more, the receiver block as shown in Fig. 6.8, is modified to generate
keys in bi-direction. Frequency division duplexity(FDD) is used to generate the
keys in bi-direction. Frequencies namely 865 MHz and 867 MHz are employed
for FDD. For key generation, the RSSI is measured to obtain channel profile. The
vector bits for the preliminary key are obtained by quantizing the channel profiles.
For a decimation factor of 4000, the correlation co-efficient of the channel pro-
files in 0.8. The time taken to measure per sample is 0.2 seconds. The channel
reciprocity measured in FDD mode for the frequencies 865-867 MHz is as shown
in Fig. 6.9 and 6.10.
6.5 Summary
The key generation methods proposed in the previous chapter namely: KGECR,
HCKG, KFKG, and CFKG are validated using testbed that reflect the real world
channel measurements. The real world channel measurements include; MIMO
measurements, RSSI profiles from wireless cards, and measurements obtained
from the real-time demonstrator.
The channel profiles are validated using the framework as indicated in Fig.
6.1. The validation includes methods from the state of the art such as; Radio-
Telepathy, ASBG, MAQ, ESPAR, Median, and Smart method of quantisation and
the proposed methods namely; KGECR, HCKG, KFKG, and CFKG.
The proposed methods are validated using the following metrics namely; BDR,
KGR (quantisation factor), test of randomness, robustness test, and eavesdropper
test. Due to enhancements in reciprocity, the rate of disagreement between the
preliminary keys is reduced as seen from Table 6.4 and 6.1. The impact of en-
hancing reciprocity before quantisation can also be seen in enhancing quantisation
efficiency as seen in Tables 6.5 and 6.2.
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Thus, a complete evaluation of the proposed methodology is presented and
evaluated to validate improvements in performance of the key generation using
variations of the wireless channel.
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Figure 6.5: Indication of varying power levels for channel Chc.
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Figure 6.6: Signal processing blocks for transmitting ”Hello World”.
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Table 6.7: Eavesdropper Test on RSSI Profiles.
Algorithm type BDR% EVE BDR % Janet
KGECR 20.6 18.4
HCKG 59.5 52.08
KFKG 40.4 53.06
CFKG 40 46.9
Table 6.8: BDR Robustness Test on RSSI Profiles.
Algorithm type 5dB 10dB 15dB 20dB
ASBG 24.7 24.7 24.7 24.7
Median 36.3 36.3 36.3 36.3
MAQ 32.36 32.36 32.36 32.36
ESPAR 20.6 20.6 20.6 20.6
Radio-Telepathy 37.6 37.6 37.6 37.6
Barasochhi 22 22 22 22
KGECR 6.8 7.2 5.6 8.2
HCKG 8.49 8.49 8.49 8.49
KFKG 6.21 6.21 6.21 6.21
CFKG 3.02 3.02 3.02 3.02
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Figure 6.7: Frame format of transmitter.
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Table 6.9: KGR Robustness Test on RSSI Profiles.
Algorithm type 5dB 10dB 15dB 20dB
ASBG 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9
Median 2 2 2 2
MAQ 2 2 2 2
ESPAR 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8
Radio-Telepathy 1.936 1.936 1.936 1.936
Barasochhi 4 4 4 4
KGECR 3.41 3.41 3.41 3.41
HCKG 0.85 0.85 0.85 0.85
KFKG 3.2 3.2 3.2 3.2
CFKG 3.02 3.02 3.02 3.02
Table 6.10: Specifications for the Signal Processing Blocks.
Parameter Value
Modulation Scheme QPSK
Center Frequency f1 = 865, f2 = 867 MHZ
Pulse shaping Root-raised Cosine filter  = 0:5
Preamble Barker codes, N=13
Scrambler (1; 1; 1; 0; 1) with [0000] initial conditions
Symbol duration Ts = 5s
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Table 6.11: Specifications of the Software Defined Radio.
Software GNU Radio Companion
Motherboard USRP N210
FPGA Xilinx Spartan 3A-DSP 3400 FPGA
ADC 100 MS/s dual ADC
DAC 400 MS/s dual DAC
Connectivity Gigabit Ethernet
Daughter board WBX (50-2200 MHz)
Antenna 3dBi gain Vert900
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Figure 6.8: Signal processing blocks for receiver and preliminary key generation.
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Chapter 7
Conclusion
7.1 Channel Aware Adaptation of Spreading Sequences
Spreading sequences are characterised by the properties of periodic and aperiodic
correlation. They are usually allocated to users irrespective of their channel con-
ditions. The principle of channel aware adaptation as described in [84] is the basis
for dynamically allocating sequences to users. For a given channel condition h(t),
a sequence s(t) is chosen such that the product of their aperiodic autocorrelation
is maximised. By maximising the product, the magnitude of the energy of the
received signal, is maximised and thus spreading sequences can be allocated to
users based on their channel condition. Based on this principle, following are the
contributions of my thesis in this topic namely:
1. By considering a simulation model, spreading sequences are allocated to
users dynamically based on their channel condition. The dynamic allo-
cation is based on an optimal allocation scheme known as the Hungarian
algorithm. The performance of the down-link consisting of K = 15 users
for Walsh-Hadamard sequences is a gain of up to 3 dB is achieved per user.
While in case of Gold sequences, gain of up to 1 dB per user is achieved.
The computational complexity of allocation scheme is O(K3).
107
2. The optimal Hungarian algorithm is computationally intensive. To combat
this problem a sub-optimal but fast allocation scheme is proposed through
an analytical model. The analytical model consists of a step function that al-
locates pseudo-dynamically instead of dynamically. A similar performance
of gain up to 2 dB for Walsh-Hadamard sequences and up to 1 dB for Gold
sequences is obtained at a reduced computational complexity of O(1).
3. As a proof-of-concept, real-world channel estimates are obtained by using
a testbed based on the software defined radio platform, USRP. The chan-
nel estimates include channel impulse responses of one, two, three and four
taps. These channel estimates are used to allocate sequences to users dy-
namically inorder to obtain a gain of upto 1 dB for both Walsh-Hadamard
and Gold spreading sequences.
Thus different methodologies for adapting spreading sequences based on the chan-
nel condition have been investigated. By choosing sequences with good cross-
correlation properties and adapting these sequences based on channel conditions
enhancements in the performance of the DS-CDMA downlink can be achieved.
7.2 Physical Layer Security
Fading is an inherent characteristic of the wireless channel due to which variations
in the amplitude and phase of the received signal exist. By using the properties
of the wireless channel, a shared secret between pair of nodes was established in
[41]. The process consists of measuring the channel profile, quantizing it to get
preliminary keys, detecting and correcting errors to obtain a synchronized key at
both the nodes. Further methods of privacy amplification are also done to enhance
system entropy.
Based on this principle, improved methods of key generation schemes utilising
the random and reciprocal variations of the wireless channel have been proposed.
Following are the main contributions of my thesis namely:
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1. A baseline architecture model clearly depicting the four stages of key gen-
eration that have been implemented include; channel measurement, quanti-
sation, information reconciliation, and privacy amplification.
2. A fifth stage namely ”enhancing reciprocity” is proposed to improve the
reciprocity of the channel profiles. The various methods used to enhance
the channel profile are:
(a) l1-norm minimisation
(b) Hierarchical clustering
(c) Kalman filtering
(d) Polynomial regression
3. For the l1-nom minimisation method, a binary quantiser is used to generate
the preliminary keys. While for the other three methods namely; hierar-
chical clustering, Kalman filtering, and Polynomial regression, an adaptive
quantisation is proposed.
4. The disagreeing bits of the preliminary keys are detected and corrected us-
ing Turbo codes to obtain a synchronised keys.
5. To prevent any possibilities of key prediction, secure hash (SHA-1) of the
synchronised key are generated to obtain, secure keys.
6. An architectureKeyBunch that utilises all the characteristic of wireless chan-
nels and generates, synchronised and secure bunch of secret keys is pro-
posed. The main advantage of KeyBunch is that instead of generating a
single key, sets of secure keys can be generated by using either the same or
multiple sources of channel profile that are inturn obtained from the same
physical layer.
7. As a use-case, KeyBunch is deployed in the secure vehicular communica-
tions architecture to generate keys between vehicle-to-vehicle and vehicle-
to-roadside-infrastructure. By porting KeyBunch onto the HSM module it
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is shown that the system entropy of the vehicular communication can be
enhanced.
8. The proposed methods are validated using testbeds that reflect real world
channel measurements. The real world channel measurements include; MIMO
measurements, RSSI profiles from wireless cards, and USRP based real-
time demonstrator.
9. Based on the metrics of BDR, KGR(quantisation factor), test of random-
ness, robustness test, and eavesdropper test, the proposed methods along
with methods described in the state of the art are evaluated.
The evaluation results from Tables 6.1, 6.2, 6.4, and 6.5, indicate that enhanc-
ing channel reciprocity leads to a significant improvement in performance of key
generation.
7.3 Future Work
The following future work is suggested as a continuation of the thesis.
1. The traditional method of designing sequences is to use mathematical tools
such as Galois Fields [61] and then deduce its correlation properties. An
open mathematical problem is to find sequences with known correlation
properties, i.e. can a sequence be designed for any given correlation prop-
erty?
2. Key generation in correlated MIMO channels: Since the channels in MIMO
could be correlated, secret keys generated from such correlated sources will
be weak. So it is necessary to propose methods that will extract keys from
such correlated sources and yet be able to deliver improved methods of key
generation.
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3. Conventional methods transmit and receive using half-duplex diversity by
either using Time Division or Frequency division duplexity. Recently meth-
ods of transmitting and receiving in the same frequency at the same time,
i.e. full-duplex transmission and reception have been proposed in [49, 22,
23, 33]. Although still in conceptual stage, such a method offers promis-
ing prospects. Using full duplexity Alice and Bob can measure the channel
profile simultaneously at the same time thereby consequently increasing the
channel reciprocity and hence resulting in an improved performance of key
generation.
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Chapter 8
Zusammenfassung
8.1 Kanalbewusste Anpassung von Spreizcodes
Spreizcodes werden anhand ihrer periodischen und aperiodischen Korrelation-
seigenschaften charakterisiert. Sie werden meist Nutzern unabha¨ngig von ihrem
Kanalzustand zugewiesen. Die Grundlage von dynamischer Nutzerzuordnung ist
das Prinzip der kanalbewussten Anpassung, wie in [85] beschrieben. Fu¨r einen
gegebenen Kanalzustand h(t) wird eine Sequenz s(t) gewa¨hlt, sodass das Pro-
dukt der aperiodischen Autocorrelation maximiert wird. Die Magnitude der En-
ergie des erhaltenen Signals wird maximiert, wenn das Produkt maximiert wird.
So knnen Spreizcodes Nutzern kanalzustandabha¨ngig zugeordnet werden. Die
Hauptbeitra¨ge meiner Arbeit sind:
1. Anhand eines Simulationsmodels werden Spreizcodes den Nutzern dynamisch
und kanalabha¨ngig zugeordnet. Die dynamische Zuordnung basiert auf dem
optimalen Zuordnungsschema bekannt als Hungarian Algorithmus. Die
Leistung des down-link bestehend aus K = 15 Nutzern verbessert sich
fu¨r eine Walsh-Hadamard Sequenz um 3 dB pro Nutzer. Dagegen kann bei
einer Gold Sequenz eine Leistungsverbesserung von bis zu 1 dB pro Nutzer
erzielt werden. Die Komplexita¨t fu¨r das Zuordnungsschema betra¨gtO(K3).
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2. Der optimale Hungarian Algorithmus ist rechenintensiv. Daher wird eine
suboptimale, aber schnelle, analytische Mode zur Lo¨sung des Problems
vorgeschlagen. Die analytische Methode besteht aus einer Stufenfunktion,
die pseudo-dynamisch anstatt dynamisch zuordnet. Ein a¨hnlicher Leis-
tungsgewinn von bis zu 2 dB fu¨r eine Walsh-Hadamard Sequenz und bis
zu 1 dB fu¨r eine Gold Sequenz wird bei einer reduzierten Komplexita¨t von
O(1) erzielt .
3. Als Proof-of-Concept werden Echtzeit Kanalscha¨tzungen in einer Entwick-
lungsumgebung basierend auf der software defined radio platform USRP
vorgenommen. Die Kanalscha¨tzungen beinhalten Kanalimpulse von eins,
zwei, drei und vier taps. Die Kanalscha¨tzungen werden dazu genutzt Nutzern
Spreizcodes dynamisch zuzuordnen, um einen Leistungsgewinn von 1 dB
sowohl fr eineWalsh-Hadamard als auch fu¨r eine Gold Sequenz zu erhalten.
So wurden verschiedene Methoden fu¨r die kanalzustandsabha¨ngige Zuordnung
von Spreizcodes untersucht. Indem man Sequenzen mit guten Kreuz-korrelations
eigenschaften auswa¨hlt und diese Sequenzen an den Kanalzustand anpasst, kann
man die Leistung des DS-CDMA down-link verbessern.
8.2 Physical Layer Security
Abklingen (Schwund) ist eine inha¨rente Eigenschaft von kabelloser U¨bertragung,
die Variationen in der Amplitude und Phase des erhaltenen Signals bewirkt. In
[42] wurden die Eigenschaften von kabelloser U¨bertragung dazu genutzt ein geteiltes
Geheimnis zwischen einem Knotenpaar auszutauschen. Der Prozess besteht aus
einer Messung des Kanalprofiles, Quantisierung um einen vorla¨ufigen Schlu¨ssel
zu erhalten, Fehlererkennung und Verbesserung um einen synchronisierten Schlu¨ssel
an beiden Knoten zu erhalten . Weiter Methoden zur Privacy Amplification wer-
den zusa¨tzlich benutzt um die Entropie des Systems zu verbessern.
Basierend auf diesem Prinzip wurden Methoden zur Schlu¨sselerzeugung, die
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die zufa¨lligen und reziproken Variationen des Kanals nutzen, vorgeschlagen. Die
Hauptbeitra¨ge meiner Arbeit sind:
1. Eine Basis Architektur, die klar die vier Phasen der Schlu¨sselerzeugung
wiedergibt. Die vier diskutierten und umgesetzten Phase bestehen aus:
Kanalmessung, Quantisierung, Information reconciliation und Privacy Am-
plification.
2. Eine fu¨nfte Phase, enhancing reciprocity, wird vorgeschlagen um die Reziprozita¨t
des Kanalprofiles zu verbessern. FolgendeMethoden wurden zur Verbesserung
des Kanalprofils eingesetzt:
(a) l1-norm minimisation
(b) Hierarchical clustering
(c) Kalman filtering
(d) Polynomial regression
3. Fu¨r die l1-norm Minimierung wird die Methode des binren Quantisierens
benutzt, wa¨hrend fu¨r die drei anderen, hierarchical clustering, Kalman fil-
tering, polynomial regression, die adaptive Quantisierung benutzt wird.
4. Ein Architektur, KeyBunch, wird vorgeschlagen, die alle Eigenschaften
eines kabellosen Kanals nutzt und einen sicheren Bund von Geheimschlu¨sseln
erzeugt und synchronisiert. Der Hauptvorteil von KeyBunch ist, dass anstelle
eines einzelnen Schlu¨ssels ganze Gruppen von Schlu¨sseln erzeugt werden,
die entweder die gleiche oder mehrere Quellen des Kanalprofiles nutzen
und in der gleichen physikalischen Schicht entstehen.
5. Als Anwendungsbeispiel wird KeyBunch in der sicheren Fahrzeugkommu-
nikation eingesetzt um Schlu¨ssel zwischen vehicle-to-vehicle und vehicle-
to-roadside infrastructure zu erzeugen.
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6. Die vorgeschlagenen Methoden werden in Entwicklungsumgebungen, die
Echtzeitkanalmessungen reflektieren, validiert. Die Echtzeitkanalmessun-
gen beinhalten, MIMOMessungen, RSSI Profile von drahtlosen Karten und
USRP basierende Echzeitdemonstratoren.
7. Basierend auf den Metriken von BDR, KGR (quantisation factor), test of
randomness, robustness test und eavesdropper test werden die vorgeschla-
genen Methoden mit den im State-of-Art Abschnitt beschriebenen Metho-
den verglichen.
Wie in den Tabellen 6.1, 6.2, 6.4 und 6.5 angedeutet, verringert der BDR die
Anzahl der Fehler im vorla¨ufigen Schlu¨ssel, indem er die Kanal Reziprozita¨t
verbessert. Die Verbesserung der Reziprozita¨t erho¨ht auch die Rate der Schlu¨sselerzeugung.
Daraus la¨sst sich folgern, dass die Effizienz der Schlu¨sselerzeugung durch die Ve-
rarbeitung des Kanalprofiles vor der Quantiserung verbessert werden kann.
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